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Vertical Effects

Miguel de la Mano* Member of the Chief Economist Team DG COMP, European Commission

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of DG COMP or the European Commission

Definitions

- Vertical Mergers
 - Involves companies in a supplier-customer relationship.
 - Merging firms operate at different levels of the supply chain
- Conglomerate mergers
 - a merger that is neither purely horizontal nor purely vertical
 - In practice, focus is on companies active in closely related markets
 - goods are complements in demand
 - share the customer pool

General observations

- Non-horizontal mergers raise different concerns than horizontal mergers
 - no loss of direct competition between the merging parties
 - possible complementarity of merging parties
 - Significant efficiencies
- However, merger may change the ability and incentive to compete on the part of the merging company and the competitors in ways that cause harm to consumers:
 Foreclosure
 - Enhanced risk of collusion

Consumer Welfare Why? Who? Where? When?

- Consensus: Ex-ante optimal policy is to maximise TW but a bias towards consumers better enforces this standard
 - 1. information advantages of firms (Besanko & Spulber, 1993)
 - 2. lobbying advantages of firms (Neven & Roeller, 2000)
 - 3. encouraging first-best mergers, i.e. those which are optimal from a social welfare viewpoint (Fridolfsson, 2002 and Lyons, 2003)
- Consumers = customers of the firms subject to foreclosure

- What about intermediate buyers not competing with the integrated firm?
- What if the merger allows a supplier to extract rents, with no loss in allocative efficiency (or even efficiency gains)?
 - But what if incentives or ability to innovate is reduced?
- What if the merger allows a buyer to extract rents, but there are losses in efficiency?
- What if due to non-linear pricing welfare loses are felt several levels down in the supply chain?

Vertical mergers

- Advantages of non-integration:
 - External pressure from competition keeps each entity "on their toes"
 - Easier to handle smaller entities
 - Better focus on core activities
- Advantages of integration
 - Easier to align activities and incentives
 - Internalize externalities

Aligned incentives

M. 3868 DONG/Elsam/E2
DONG receives gas in a steady flow

but customers mainly need the gas in the winter
solution: storage

Elsam and E2 use gas to produce electricity

But they also use other fuels (coal, oil, wood-pellets and

straw)

Merger potential: use power plants as virtual storage

■ By using gas in the summer and other fuels in the winter

Besides...there is only one monopoly profit!?


- Except that...
- The upstream monopoly may not be able to extract all the profit when:
 - Buyers are differentiated and it cannot price discriminate
 - It cannot commit to restrict sales at the monopoly level
 - It is subject to price regulation upstream
- In most cases there is some (actual or potential) competition upstream
 - Raising rivals costs allows an integrated firm to make greater profits downstream
 - Entry from one level to the other may be easier
 - Information regarding rivals costs or strategies may be valuable downstream (e.g. electricity pools, bidding markets)

Most common concern: Foreclosure


- Vertical mergers may foreclose competition by
 - raising the costs at which competitors can operate on a downstream market (*raising rivals' cost*); typically associated with <u>input foreclosure</u>
 - and/or lowering the expected revenue streams of upstream competitors (*reducing rivals' revenues*); typically associated with <u>customer foreclosure</u>

 \rightarrow may affect the ability or incentive of competitors to compete, and thereby negatively affect consumers

Input foreclosure



Customer Foreclosure



Analytical framework

- Need to examine:
 - 1. Ability to foreclose (would prices upstream increase?)
 - Incentive to foreclose (would profits of the integrated firm increase?)
 - 3. Likely impact on effective competition (would prices downstream increase?)
- In practice all elements are linked (equilibrium analysis)

Ability to foreclose

Necessary conditions:

■ the input must be important (e.g. in cost terms)

merged entity must have market power upstream

- E.g. other upstream rivals are less efficient, offer less preferred alternatives, cannot expand easily
- Input foreclosure may also expose downstream rivals to independent upstream suppliers with increased market power


Possible counter-strategies of downstream rivals


Incentive to foreclose

- Incentive to foreclose depends on the degree to which it is profitable
- Merged entity faces possible trade-off between
 - profit loss due to no longer supplying to downstream rivals and
 - profit gain due to expanding sales downstream and/or being able to raise price in that market
- Incentive to foreclose may be higher in case
 - Profits upstream are low (compared with downstream)
 - Possibility to expand downstream high (e.g. foreclosed rival is a close competitor or will suffer capacity constraints)
 - Merged entity has high market share downstream

Impact on competition

- Merger may raise rivals' costs thereby causing an upward pressure on rivals' prices. This may in turn allow the merged entity to raise price
 - Effect more likely to be significant when proportion of foreclosed rivals is high or foreclosed rivals are close competitors
- Merger may allow merger entity to raise entry barriers
 - In particular if foreclosure necessitates "two-level entry"





How to deal with countervailing factors?

- Who is the buyer that exercises countervailing power?
- What about countervailing seller power?
- If the merger forecloses entry? Can it also induce entry?
- Efficiencies to be identified and substantiated by the merging parties
 - Incl. possible internalisation of double mark-ups?
 - But what if the merging fears an efficiency offence?
 - Could the efficiency offence be legitimate (in the sense that ultimately consumers are worse off despite the efficiencies)?

Restoring monopoly power

- A non-integrated upstream monopolist has a serious selfdiscipline (i.e commitment) problem which limits its ability to exploit its monopoly power (analogous to durable good monopolies).
 - It cannot commit to abstain from secretly discounting to any downstream firm, in a form of post-contractual opportunism.
 - Thus the source of this problem is contractual incompleteness (no contracts contingent on profitability measures and no exclusivity)
- Through vertical integration a monopolist acquires a direct stake on downstream profits which allow it to credibly commit not to offer secret discounts to rivals.
- Integration only imperfectly solves this commitment problem because the monopolist cannot commit not to favour its downstream units when independent units exist.

Policy relevance of RMP

- Vertical integration helps the upstream monopolist to circumvent its commitment problem and to (credibly) maintain monopoly prices.
- Empirical validity requires:
 - Non-linear pricing is assumed to exclude gains from eliminating double marginalisation. Is this always realistic?
 - Contract incompleteness
- Weaknesses:
 - Multiple equilibria
 - No explanation of how vertical integration might foreclose an equally efficient competitor. This narrows its scope.
 - Vertical integration is not necessary: Exclusive agreements also circumvent the problem. This has implications for policy.
- Also note that the merger does not restrict competition. It allows the merged entity to commit to a strategy. Should this be challenged provided the monopoly was achieved legitimately?

Conglomerate mergers Pro-competitive effects

- Conglomerate mergers generally have no negative effects on competition.
- Due to specialization through division of labour it is often more efficient that certain components are marketed together rather than separately.
- More generally bundling or tying can lead to:
 - Cost savings that derive from some form of economy of scope (either on the production or the consumption side (e.g. one-stop-shop).
 - Value enhancements can result from better compatibility and quality assurance of complementary components
 - Internalisation of pricing externalities (the Cournot effect)
- But such efficiencies must be merger specific!

The Cournot effect (internalizing a pricing externality)

- → Bundling is more profitable than offering each component separately: lowering the price of one component increases the sale of its own complementary component and not that of rival manufacturers.
- → Does not depend on form of demand or cost function
- → It does not require for goods to be perfect complements
- → Implicit assumption: There are linear prices (reflecting uncertainty about customers' willingness to pay)

Importance of the Cournot Effect

Cournot effect is larger (i.e. static incentives to bundle increase)

- → If system demand is relatively inelastic (but not perfectly)
- → As the *size of the bundle* increases (and/or components have similar weights)
- With higher levels of *uncertainty about customer valuations* It is difficult to measure this kind of uncertainty but it is likely to be non-negligible:
 - No incentive for customers to reveal their willingness to pay during a negotiation
 - Preferences are affected by multiple factors which differ in intensity and relevance in different situations
 - Exogenous and unpredictable events as well as innovation continuously alter such preferences
- However because there are rival firms, there will also be a response to a price cut (in equilibrium). This response may offset the potential gain to the merging firms. (i.e. cross price elasticities matter)

Presumption of innocence

- Not if there is fierce competition in the market for one component.
- Chicago School argument in a nutshell:
 - the monopoly price of good A on its own is m
 - the competitive price of good B is **c**.
 - If the monopolist were to earn higher profits at price x for a bundle of A and B, then consider the implied monopoly price m' = x -c.
 - Since good B is available at c, anyone who buys the bundle is willing to pay an incremental price of x-c for A.
 - Were the monopolist to charge x-c for A alone and eliminate the bundle, its demand and, hence, its profits would be at least as large (as there may be some consumers who do not value good B even at its cost c).

Foreclosure mechanisms of tying/bundling

- Commitment to compete aggressively
- Soften competition by enhancing product differentiation
- Prevent sequential entry into the tied and tying market
- Reduce rivals revenues thereby inducing exit or prevent entry

Conglomerates are more likely to be neutral than Horizontal Mergers...

But two reasons to be cautious:

- Conglomerate effects are more difficult to assess than horizontal effects.
- It also follows that the deterrence effect is lesser than in horizontal mergers*

*(e.g. assume 50% of HM and 10% of CM are anti-competitive. Merging parties expect most anticompetitive HM will be challenged so only 10% of anticompetitive HM are notified. This implies the proportion of <u>notified</u> HM and CG that are anticompetitive is the same (10%)