# Adoption of the Internet by Commercial Establishments: Urban density, Global Village and Industry Composition

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#### **Abstract**

This study offers hard evidence on the geographic dispersion of electronic commerce to businesses. We test opposing theories on how urban locations influenced the diffusion of Internet technology. Global village theory asserts that Internet technology reduces the importance of distance and reverses the trend to urbanization. Urban density theory predicts that the Internet follows a traditional pattern of diffusion, first to urban areas with complementary technical and knowledge resources. A third theory, industry composition, argues that some of the geographic variation in use is due to the agglomeration of IT-intensive industries.

The paper finds evidence that participation in the Internet is more likely in rural areas than in urban areas once controls for industry are included. Nevertheless, talk about the dissolution of the city is premature. Frontier Internet technologies appear more often at establishments in urban areas, even with industry controls. Major urban areas also contain many establishments from IT-intensive industries, which acts to reinforce the concentration of frontier Internet technologies in large urban areas. However, because IT-intensive industries are numerous and widespread, so too is the use of frontier technology.

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## 1. Introduction

While information technology spending had been growing rapidly over 1990 to 1995, the timing and form of the Internet's commercialization caught all but a small number of technical cognoscenti by surprise. After 1995 the vast majority of business establishments were faced with a decision about how to react to the availability of new capabilities.

US business reacted with the largest growth rates in investment in information technology in the history of the United States. Stocks of information technology capital grew at a 20% annual growth rate from the end of 1995 to the end of 2000. By 2000 computer hardware and software stocks had reached 622.2 billion dollars. The majority of this investment was affiliated with enabling business applications. In 2000, for example, business investment in IT goods and services was almost triple the level for personal consumption of similar goods.

The level of these investment flows is immense and so is the variance across locations.<sup>4</sup> Enterprises in some locations have completely adopted the Internet across all facets of economic activity, while other locations are still at the earliest stages of adjusting to digital technology. Two competing theories for explaining this variance have received the most attention. First, "global village" theory predicts that firms in small cities and rural areas adopted the Internet more quickly than urban firms because the marginal returns to use are higher in a remote location or a location lacking economies of density. In contrast,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This includes computer hardware, computer software, communications hardware and instruments. See Price and McKittrick (2002) or Henry and Dalton (2002). The growth rates are even higher if communications equipment and instruments are excluded.

These are constant (1996) dollars. See Henry and Dalton (2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For 2000, estimated personal consumption of IT goods and services was \$165 billion. For business it was \$466 billion. See Henry and Dalton (2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For extensive description of this variance, see our previous paper, Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2002).

the "urban density" theory predicts adoption will be most extensive in big cities because they have pooled resources that lower the costs of adopting new technologies.

Despite much speculation about the pattern of diffusion and much policy interest, little empirical research confirms or refutes competing hypotheses. This paper is the first to adjudicate this debate with hard data. Specifically, our study concentrates on a single, major, well defined, and reasonably well recorded development – adoption of business applications of the Internet – to test between competing theories about the geographic diffusion of Internet technology. We estimate econometric models of Internet adoption at the establishment level, focusing our analysis on comparing the marginal contribution of location, industry, and complexity of application.

Our estimates examine decision-making among the largest investors in information technology (IT) in the US economy: approximately two thirds of the United States work force is employed in the type of establishments studied. Specifically, we analyze Internet adoption at 86,879 establishments with over one hundred employees; this sample comprises roughly half of US establishments of such size. The data come from a survey updated to the end of 2000. Harte Hanks Market Intelligence, a commercial market research firm that tracks use of Internet technology in business, undertook the survey.

Three central findings support the conclusions our of study:

- *Urban density theory* does not explain adoption of the Internet for simple purposes. Adoption does not increase with the size and density of a city. There is some evidence that the opposite holds. Adoption of simple Internet applications is closer to more utopian theories associated with the promise of the Internet, which we label *global village theory*.
- We reach the opposite conclusion for complex applications requiring more technical support and third party servicing, i.e., we reject *global village theory* for complex

applications. The probability that an establishment adopts complex Internet applications increases with the population and density of location, consistent with *urban density theory*.

• The type of industry found in major cities plays a key role in explaining the variance between cities, which we label *industry composition theory*. More information-intensive industries tend to cluster in urban areas. Urban density theory and industry composition theory interact in a complementary way for complex applications. This interaction could exacerbate agglomeration in use. However, because IT-intensive industries are numerous and geographically quite dispersed, so too is use of frontier technology. We find no evidence of agglomeration among simple technologies.

Besides bringing hard data to bear on the geographic variance in Internet use, our investigation also contributes novel findings to the debate about whether information technology acts as a substitute or complement to the agglomeration of economic activity (e.g., Gasper and Glaeser, 1998). Unlike some studies in this vein, we do not consider the determinants of long run equilibrium, i.e., where firms relocate after technology markets develop (e.g., Beardsell and Henderson, 1999; Kolko, 2002). Rather, we examine the short run reaction of establishments to the diffusion of a technology.

When examining substitution/complementarities, our empirical question is similar in spirit to Kolko (2000). Examining domain name registrations in the context of a periphery/central city model, he finds that users in cities of medium size and above have registration patterns consistent with those areas benefiting disproportionately from the Internet. We are also similar in spirit to Sinai and Waldfogel (2001). They examine household behavior for evidence that Internet content is either a substitute or complement to content found locally. We differ from both these papers in our focus on adoption by business establishments, as opposed to commercial domain registrations by firms or household Internet use. Moreover, our decomposition of the geographic variation of

Internet use into industry- and location-specific factors enables us test hypothesizes unexamined by prior work.

The present study is also broadly similar to our earlier work (Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein, 2002). It established that the variance in geographical patterns of technology adoption by business differed substantially from the variance uncovered in any existing research on households or infrastructure deployment. This study differs in its focus on decomposing the factors underlying aggregate variance, and in its hypothesis testing.

We ultimately accept hypotheses based on the formulation that the Internet is a General Purpose Technology or GPT (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). While others have hypothesized that the Internet is a GPT (e.g., see Harris, 1998), our study is the first to link this formulation to statistical analysis of adoption behavior by commercial businesses. It inspires our attention to the distinction between simple and complex applications, which rely to different degrees on local market-based support. In our characterization of how local pooled resources influence the returns to adopting complex applications, we are similar to adoption studies that examine how knowledge spillovers (e.g., Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002) and variations in education and skill level (e.g., Chun 2003; Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997) affect demand for new technologies.

Our analysis and findings contrast strongly with the prevailing analysis inspired by the literature on the digital divide. To be sure, as in this literature, we do find that some regions are leaders and some are laggards in the use of Internet technology. However, we do not conclude that use of the Internet concentrated in a small number of places.<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, we emphasize the sharp differences between the diffusion processes shaping

<sup>5</sup> For example, Zooks (2000a, b) and Gorman (2002), among many others, examine the Internet in terms of "global city theory", where a few key locations act as economic hubs for other areas. They argue that the economic effects from the diffusion of the Internet concentrate in a small number of cities.

simple and complex applications, which support a much different explanation about the factors shaping geographic variation in use.

The next two sections describe the theoretical framework, the data, and the empirical method. Section 4 describes regional variation in Internet adoption rates.

Sections 5 and 6 separate out the relative importance of global village theory, urban density theory, and industry composition theory. Section 7 concludes with observations about how our findings shape the analysis of the economic returns from the diffusion of Internet technology.

## 2. Framework and testable hypotheses

Why are technologies, such as the Internet, adopted at different rates by different firms? We offer a framework that describes theories about how the benefits and costs of adoption vary across establishments in different locations.

Consider an establishment's decision to adopt a new technology such as Internet access or inter-firm networking capabilities. Below we will consider adoption of both a simple and a complex application of the Internet.<sup>6</sup> For notational simplicity we consider only a generic application of technology in this section. Establishment i will adopt Internet technology by time t if

$$NB(x_i,z_i,t) \equiv B(x_i,z_i,t) - C(x_i,z_i,t) > 0$$

where NB is the net benefit of adoption, B is the gross benefit of adoption, and C is the cost of adoption. We let  $x_i$  describe geographic conditions, such as population size and density, while  $z_i$  describes industry characteristics that may impact a firm's decision to adopt Internet technology. Both features are fixed over time for establishments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Our data analysis will consider adoption of two distinct layers of Internet technology. It is easily generalizable to more than two.

Our empirical work will examine one cross section at time t. Since adoption of the Internet is rarely reversed, we are comfortable with the data-driven requirement that we suppress the time dimension. Under the standard "probit model" of diffusion (e.g., David 1969), adoption costs decline over time and timing of adoption coincides with intensity of demand. We employ the standard implication for a cross section at any point in time: The difference between adoption and non-adoption reveals the threshold between those with high and low valuations from use.<sup>7</sup>

We now discuss different theories about the shape of  $NB(x_i, z_i)$  which give competing predictions about the role of location in the adoption of Internet by commercial establishments. Table 1 lists each of these hypotheses and their predictions.

#### 2.1 Global village vs. urban density

Global village theory argues that gross adoption benefits increase as population size and density decrease (i.e.,  $dB/dx_i < 0$ , where  $x_i$  is density), and that they increase more slowly than costs ( $dC/dx_i < -dB/dx_i$  for all  $x_i$ ). Together net benefits from adoption decrease in population size and density ( $dNB/dx_i < 0$ ). While the theory is implausible for sufficiently isolated establishments (e.g., in the Mohave desert), its proponents generally focus on the predictions for existing establishments in most urban and low density settings. Global village theory predicts that the Internet will be more common among establishments in rural areas than urban areas, all other things equal. It also predicts that advances in information and communication technology will help to decrease concentration in economic activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Generally, see Rogers (1995). We allow the cost term C to include the opportunity cost of not adopting at some other time s > t, thus the net benefit condition above is both necessary and sufficient for the establishment to adopt by t. Another standard formulation would examine an establishment's decision to adopt at time t, and the equation above would be supplemented by an "arbitrage condition" (Ireland and Stoneman 1986) that it is less beneficial to adopt at any other time  $s \ne t$ .

This hypothesis depends on two observations. While all business establishments benefited from an increase in capabilities, establishments in rural or small urban areas will derive the most benefit from overcoming diseconomies of small local size. That is, Internet technology substitutes for the disadvantages associated with a remote location. Moreover, establishments in rural areas lack substitute data communication technologies for lowering communication costs, such as fixed private lines.

The most utopian versions of this hypothesis have received considerable exposure.<sup>8</sup> Yet, even the more tempered forecasts are generally treated with skepticism by most academic research on the geography of the Internet. This hypothesis has not been directly tested, and has not had much empirical verification (Forman (2002) is an exception).

Urban density theory stands in opposition to global village theory. Urban density theory argues that adoption costs increase as population size and density decrease (i.e.,  $dC/dx_i < 0$ , where  $x_i$  is density), and that these costs increase faster than benefits  $(dC/dx_i > -dB/dx_i)$ . Together net benefits of adoption increase in population size and density  $(dNB/dx_i > 0)$ . Urban density theory predicts that the Internet will be less common in rural areas than urban areas, all other things equal.

There are three major factors supporting this hypothesis: (1) availability of complementary information technology infrastructure, (2) labor market thickness for complementary services or specialized skills, and (3) knowledge spillovers. These are closely related to the three major reasons given for industrial agglomeration (e.g., Marshall 1920; Krugman 1991). For example, the availability of low-cost complementary inputs,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Most discussion of this hypothesis follws from Cairncross (1997, p. 1), who was an early proponent of global village theory. She states that "The death of distance as a determinant of the cost of communicating will probably be the single most important force shaping society in the first half of the next century."

such as broadband services or Internet access, will have an impact on the cost of adopting participation or enhancement.<sup>9</sup>

This theory has received considerable exposure, partially because the literature on the urban/rural digital divide highlights this concern. For example, both Gorman (2002) and Zooks (2000a, b), summarizing the conclusions of many others as well as their own research, express this view quite strongly (see, also, Castells, 2003). They argue that Internet technology is a complement to urban agglomeration.

In comparing global village and urban density theories, we will further contrast simple purposes for business use of the Internet with complex ones. 11 The simple purposes, together labeled *participation*, relate to activities such as email and web browsing.

Participation represents the most common and generic use of the Internet for basic communications. The complex purposes, together labeled *enhancement*, relate to investment in frontier Internet technologies linked to computing facilities. These technologies are often known as "e-commerce," and involve tailoring complementary changes to internal business computing processes. These investments represent the most idiosyncratic and difficult investments. We provide more precise definitions in section 3.2.

The contrast between our participation and enhancement results are informative about local adaptation costs. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) argue that the invention of a GPT like the Internet involves high fixed costs. Users typically have to adapt the GPT to their particular environments. Adoption involves a combination of (1) reproduction and (2) co-invention to meet idiosyncratic circumstances. All other things equal, when

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> By this time period, almost all but the poorest and most remote geographic areas were serviced by dial-up Internet Service Providers (Downes and Greenstein, 2002). Yet, broadband access was disproportionately an urban technology (USDA, 2001, Crandall and Alleman, 2002)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This is a particular prominent theme in the series of reports from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (1995, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b). See, also, Moss and Townsend (1997).

In this choice, we follow Forman (2002), who found that investment clustered around a few key margins of behavior. For further motivation see the discussion in our companion study, Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2002).

requirements and constraints are idiosyncratic, co-invention issues are expensive to address. When the issues are generic and common, co-invention expenses are lower, spread among a larger set of users.

Adaptation costs are relevant to the adoption decision for enhancement and largely negligible for participation. If the effect of increases in density on adoption benefits (e.g.,  $dB/dx_i$ ) is similar for both participation and enhancement, the rate of improvement in net benefits with respect to density rises faster for complex applications than for simple applications. This hypothesis predicts that enhancement will be more sensitive to increases in density than participation. This is a prediction about the comparative difference between the two types of applications, but it has no implication for whether global village or urban density theory holds for none, either, or both participation or enhancement.

## 2.2 Industry composition

We distinguish between three versions of industry composition theory. These theories provide potential alternative hypotheses for why the adoption of simple and complex applications is increasing in urban density. In all cases the theory argues that there is heterogeneous demand for Internet technology, and that it increases with the information intensity of the industry. Further, establishments from the same industry tend to cluster in similar places to take advantage of thicker industry-specific labor markets and other shared local resources. For the purposes of this discussion, we allow  $z_i$  to denote the IT-intensity of an industry.

In one version of industry composition theory, concentration of Internet technology-intensive activity in some locations is due entirely to agglomeration of IT-intensive industries in those locations and has little to do with population density, per se'. Previous decisions to concentrate activity could have resulted in the clustering of some types of firms in urban areas. Concentration of adoption of new Internet technology could just be an

unintended by-product. This implies two testable hypotheses: (1) the concentration of IT-intensive industries will explain geographic variation in use for both simple and complex applications, and (2) location will have no marginal impact on adoption behavior beyond that explained by variation in industry composition. In other words, this version of the theory hypothesizes that  $dNB/dz_i > 0$ ,  $corr(x_i, z_i) > 0$  and  $dNB/dx_i = 0$ .

A second view asserts that both increasing population density and IT intensity may increase the likelihood of Internet adoption. Here, industry composition plays a role, but so does location. This version hypothesizes that  $dNB/dz_i > 0$  and  $dNB/dx_i > 0$ . We explore two variants of this alternative theory.

In one variant, which we name the industry-agglomeration complements theory, location- and industry-effects may be complementary for some applications. The high quality complementary labor markets and technical service markets that are located in large urban areas reduce the costs of adopting complex applications. IT-intensive firms may be able to better able to utilize the pooled resources in large urban areas, particularly for complex applications. To summarize,  $dNB/dz_i > 0$ ,  $dNB/dx_i > 0$ , and  $d^2NB/dx_idz_i > 0$ . We note that this is the theory receiving the most exposure in the literature on the digital divide. <sup>12</sup>

It is also theoretically possible for industry composition and urban agglomeration to be substitutes. This arises if IT-intensive industries have in-house expertise that substitutes for features associated with urban areas. In other words,  $dNB/dz_i > 0$ ,  $dNB/dx_i > 0$ , and  $d^2NB/dx_idz_i < 0$ . We title this the industry-agglomeration substitutes theory. This labor market thickness story should matter much more in areas with low populations because this story relies on absolute labor market size more than on percentages. This theory has been

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The discussions about the concentration of industrial demand tend to focus on a narrow array of industries, such as new media, dot-coms, or electronic retailing. This also leads to a focus on Silicon Valley, Silicon Alley, and the greater Boston area. In contrast, in this study we focus on all industries and locations.

discussed as a theoretical possibility (e.g., Glaser and Gasper, 1998), but has seen little empirical verification to our knowledge.<sup>13</sup>

#### 3. Data and method

The data we use for this study come from the Harte Hanks Market Intelligence CI Technology database (hereafter CI database). <sup>14</sup> The CI database contains establishment-level data on (1) establishment characteristics, such as number of employees, industry and location; (2) use of technology hardware and software, such as computers, networking equipment, printers and other office equipment; and (3) use of Internet applications and other networking services. Harte Hanks Market Intelligence (hereafter HH) collects this information to resell as a tool for the marketing divisions at technology companies. Interview teams survey establishments throughout the calendar year; our sample contains the most current information as of December 2000.

Harte Hanks tracks over 300,000 establishments in the United States. Since we focus on commercial Internet use, we exclude government establishments, military establishments and nonprofit establishments, mostly in higher education. Our sample contains all commercial establishments from the CI database that contain over 100 employees, 115,671 establishments in all; <sup>15</sup> and HH provides one observation per establishment. We will use the 86,879 clean observations with complete data generated between June 1998 and December 2000. We adopt a strategy of utilizing as many

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> One exception is Kolko (2002), who examines in agglomeration in the location decisions of IT-intensive firms

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This section provides an overview of our methodology. For a more detailed discussion, see Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Previous studies (Charles, Ives, and Leduc 2002; Census 2002) have shown that Internet participation varies with business size and that very small establishments rarely make Internet investments for enhancement. Thus, our sampling methodology enables us to track the relevant margin in investments for enhancement, while our participation estimates may overstate participation relative to the population of all business establishments.

observations as possible because we need many observations for thinly populated areas.<sup>16</sup> This necessitates routine adjustments of the data for the timing and type of the survey given by HH. Table A1 in the Appendix compares the HH data with the Census data. In general, the samples are close, so most adjustments are small.

#### 3.1. Sample construction and statistical method

Our endogenous variable will be  $y_j$ , the value to establishment j of adoption. The variable  $y_j$  is latent. We observe whether or not the establishment makes a discrete choice, for example, chooses participation or enhancement. In either case, the observed decision takes on a value of either one or zero. We will define these endogenous variables more precisely below.

In our base specification we assume that the value to an establishment j of adopting the Internet is

(1)  $y_j = \sum_i \alpha_i d_{ij} + \sum_l \beta_l d_{lj} + \sum_l \gamma_i d_{ij} + \sum_{t>1995} \delta_t d_{ij} d_{pj} + \sum_m \phi x_{mj} + \sum_q \lambda w_{qj} + \varepsilon_j$  where  $d_{ij}$  and  $d_{ij}$  are dummy variables indicating the industry and location of the establishment,  $d_{ij}$  indicates the month in which the establishment was surveyed, and  $d_{pj}$  indicates whether the establishment responded to the long survey.<sup>17</sup> The variables  $x_{mj}$  and  $w_{qj}$  denote other location-specific (e.g., population size and density) and establishment-specific variables (e.g., establishment size and dummies indicating single- or multi-establishment firm). In variations of the model, we may allow for interactions among these

<sup>17</sup> HH used two surveys. One asked for more details on IT use than the other. We interact the long survey dummy with time. See Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2002) for detail.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> If we were only interested in the features of the most populated regions of the country, then we could easily rely solely on the most recent data from the latter half of 2000, about 40% of the data. However, using only this data would result in a very small number of observations for most regions with under one million in population.

variables. If we assume the error term  $\varepsilon_j$  is i.i.d. normal, then the probability that establishment j participates can be estimated with a probit regression.

We use this model for two research purposes. Our first purpose is descriptive. We illustrate average tendencies for particular establishments in particular locations at a particular point in time. We then weight observations using Census County Business Patterns data to obtain a representative sample. We do this to establish and illustrate the extent of overall variation in adoption propensity. For the average estimates in Tables 2, 3, and 4, we calculate predicted probabilities of adoption for each establishment *as if it were* surveyed in the second half of 2000 and were given the long survey. The  $x_{mj}$  and  $w_{qj}$  are not included in this specification.

Our second (and core) purpose is to test competing hypotheses. We analyze the marginal contribution of different factors that shape adoption decisions at the establishment. We report marginal effects from a variety of different specifications, where the model listed above is our base case. The coefficients on  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , and  $\phi$  are weighted to give a representative sample. We display these results below in Tables 5 through 9 and Figures 1 through 4.

Two econometric assumptions support the estimates of marginal effects:

• Exogenous location: We examine short-run marginal effects of industry and location variables on the decision to invest in Internet technology. To identify these effects, we assume that the location of an establishment is exogenous. We argue this assumption is supported by the (ex-ante) unexpected rapid diffusion of the Internet, and through robustness checks.

First, this assumption is plausible. As noted earlier, the widespread diffusion of the Internet took most commercial establishments by surprise. Thus, firms did not make

establishment location decisions in anticipation of the Internet. Moreover, we observe short-run adoption decisions five years into the diffusion of the Internet, before medium and large establishments had time to relocate.

Second, we can test this assumption directly by comparing results between our entire sample of establishments and a special sub-sample of establishments who (we are certain) fixed their locations prior to the availability of the commercial Internet, i.e., prior to 1995. Since we find that the key estimates do not differ between these two samples, we infer that the potential endogeneity of establishment locations does not alter our inferences about the influence of location on adoption of Internet technology.

• Simultaneity bias: Our base econometric specification assumes that the adoption decision of one establishment is independent of every other. This assumption is questionable for multi-establishment firms in which a central executive decision maker (e.g., a CIO) possibly coordinates the choice to adopt or not adopt for each establishment under his domain. Depending on a wide variety of factors, adoption decisions at establishments from the same organization could be either substitutes or complements for one other. While understanding that this relationship is of independent interest, it also lies outside the scope of this study. For purposes of this study, we are concerned that simultaneity influences the coefficient of interest, the estimate of location on adoption at each establishment.

We address these concerns directly by characterizing the decisions of related establishments at other locations in a reduced form way, then measuring whether this alters the estimate of the coefficient on location, instrumenting for decisions elsewhere. Our focus will be on whether our inferences about the influence of location on adoption of Internet technology are robust to introducing simultaneity into the estimation. We will find that, no matter how we measure it, our key results do not change.

#### 3.2. Defining participation and enhancement

As a GPT, Internet technology is employed in many different uses and applications. Our sample includes at least twenty different types of Internet technology, from basic access to software for TCP/IP-based Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). Moreover, there are considerable differences in the applications used across establishments. We bracket the possibilities by identifying two types of applications, one simple and the other complex.

Participation is affiliated with basic communications, such as email use, browsing, and passive document sharing. It represents our measure of the minimal investment required to do business on the Internet. It is emphasized in many studies of "universal service" in new technologies. <sup>18</sup> Geographic differences in participation, such as urban/rural divisions, are important drivers of policy decisions in this area.

*Enhancement*, on the other hand, is affiliated with IT that either changes existing internal operations or implements new services. Enhancement is linked to the productive advance of firms and the economic growth of the regions in which these firms reside. It usually arrives as part of other intermediate goods, such as software, computing or networking equipment. Benefits accrue to the establishment that employs enhancement through the addition of competitive advantage. The costs and delays of this activity vary.<sup>19</sup>

Identifying participation was more straightforward than identifying enhancement. We identify participation when an establishment has basic Internet access or has made any type of frontier investment.<sup>20</sup> The establishment survey gives plenty of information about these activities, so we identify participation with confidence.

<sup>19</sup> Such applications often involve complementary organizational change to be used successfully. See, for example, Hubbard (2000), or Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See, e.g., Cherry, Hammond and Wildman 1999, Compaine 2001, Noll et al. 2001.

To be counted as participating in the Internet, an establishment must engage in two or more of the following activities: (1) have an Internet service provider; (2) indicate it has basic access; (3) use commerce, customer service, education, extranet, homepage, publications, purchasing or technical support; (4) use the Internet for research, or have an intranet or email based on TCP/IP protocols; (5) indicate there are Internet

In contrast, enhancement activity is less transparent in the survey. We look for indications that an establishment must have made the type of investment commonly described in books on e-commerce. We identify enhancement from the presence of substantial investments in e-commerce or e-business applications. The threshold for "substantial" is necessarily arbitrary within a range. To provide confidence that we are measuring substantial investment, we look for commitment to two or more of the following projects: Internet-based enterprise resource planning or TCP/IP-based applications in customer service, education, extranet, publications, purchasing or technical support. 22

#### 3.3. Descriptive statistics

To obtain a representative sample, we compared the number of establishments in our database to the number of establishments in the Census. We calculated the total number of establishments with more than 50 employees in the Census Bureau's 1999 County Business Patterns data and the number of establishments in our database for each two-digit NAICS code in each location. We then calculated the total number in each location. This provides the basis for our weighting. The weight for a given NAICS in a given location is

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users or Internet developers on site; or (6) outsource some Internet activities. We looked for two or more activities to guard against "false positives". This was a minor issue as most respondents responded affirmatively to many of these criteria.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> We tested slight variations on this threshold and did not find qualitatively different results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In brief, an establishment is counted as enhancing business processes when two or more hold: (1) the establishment uses two or more languages commonly used for web applications, such as Active-X, Java, CGI, Perl, VB Script, or XML; (2) the establishment has over five Internet developers; (3) the establishment has two or more "e-business" applications such as customer service, education, extranet, publications, purchasing, or technical support; (4) the establishment reports LAN software that performs one of several functions: e-commerce, enterprise resource planning, web development, or web server; (5) the establishment has an Internet server that is a UNIX workstation or server, mainframe, or minicomputer, or has 5 or more PC servers, or has Internet storage greater than 20 gigabytes; (6) the establishment answers three or more questions related to Internet server software, Internet/web software, or intranet applications. For a more precise description of some exceptional cases, see the appendix to Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2002). <sup>23</sup> We use 50 employees because potential differences between different times for taking the survey mean that firms could grow after the Census and therefore be in the CI database. It was necessary to be inclusive for the weighting because some small rural areas had less than three firms in both the Census and the CI database; and therefore if one firm grew from the time of the Census to the time of the CI survey, the weightings would be difficult to interpret. The results are robust to weighting by firms with more than 100 employees in the Census and those with more than 25 employees. This is not surprising given the high correlation between these values.

Each location-NAICS is given its weighting from its actual frequency in the Census. In other words, if our data under-samples a given two-digit NAICS at a location relative to the Census then each observation in that NAICS-location is given more importance. Appendix table A.1 compares our sample to the Census data.

In Table 2 we present average rates for participation and enhancement for the US. Participation by establishments within the sample is at 80.7% (see Unweighted Average in Table 2). The sample under-represents adopters. Our estimate of the economy-wide distribution, using the true distribution of establishments from the Census, is 88.6% (see Weighted Average in Table 2). Enhancement has been undertaken by 11.2% of our sample and 12.6% of the true distribution.

# 4. The dispersion of participation and enhancement

In this section, we argue that there is considerable variation across locations in the propensity to adopt Internet technologies. Table 3 shows participation and enhancement rates across types of locations in the United States. Because there has been little prior work on variation in use of the Internet by business, these descriptive findings are not widely appreciated. In previous work (Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein, 2002), we contrasted them with other studies of the geographic variation in household use of the Internet and infrastructure deployment. We reproduce it here because, on a broad level, this table motivates the present study. Table 3 shows sizable differences in participation and enhancement between large urban, small urban, and rural areas. On the surface, this

evidence supports either urban density theory or industry composition theory. We see that large MSAs have very high participation rates, averaging 90.4%. Participation rates in medium-sized MSAs and rural (non-MSA) areas are lower at 84.9% and 85.1%, respectively. In small MSAs the participation rates are even lower, 75.5% on average. <sup>24</sup>

The disparities in adoption rates for enhancement are even greater (again, see Table 3). Large MSAs have relatively high adoption rates, with an average of 14.7%. In medium MSAs, adoption averages 11.2%. In small MSAs the rates are even lower, 9.9% on average. Average adoption rates in large MSAs are almost one-third greater than in medium MSAs. Once again, these averages suggest that urban density theory or industry composition theory may hold. Clearly there is considerable variation in adoption propensity by city size. What produces such variance?

In Tables 4a and 4b we provide an overview of participation and enhancement adoption results for the largest economic areas in the United States. Once again, these results motivate our study. In brief, this summarizes our endogenous variable in different locations.

We list the estimates for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with over one million people, in order of highest to lowest adoption rates.<sup>25</sup> As we do in all of our tables, we list the standard errors and number of observations to identify the degree of statistical confidence in the estimates.<sup>26</sup> (For comparison, Tables 4a and 4b also list the marginal effect of location on adoption, which we will discuss later.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> From this point forward, MSAs with populations greater than 1 million will be referred to as *large MSAs*, those with between 250,000 and 999,999 will be *medium MSAs*, those with less than 250,000 will be *small MSAs*, and non-MSA areas will be called *rural*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> When two or more MSAs are part of the same urban environment, the census combines them into CMSAs. For example the Dallas-Fort Worth CMSA contains both Dallas and Forth Worth. In Table 3 we present the CMSA results rather than the individual MSA results when an MSA is part of a CMSA.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> These are computed using the delta method.

In Table 4a, we show that participation is high in major urban locations. Virtually all establishments in the major urban areas are participating. We estimate that of the fortynine MSAs, thirty-five are above 90%. All but five are within a 95% confidence interval of 90%. Nevertheless there are big differences among metropolitan areas at the extreme. In Table 4b we examine the use of enhancement at establishments in MSAs with over one million people. All but one are within a 95% confidence interval of the national average of 12.6%. The top ten include a set of areas that partially overlaps with the list in Table 4a. (Five of the top ten are also in the top ten for participation.) Still, the differences between the lowest adopting areas and the highest adopting areas are substantial.

These tables illustrate considerable variation in adoption propensity by city size and between cities of the same size. What produces such variation?

# 5. The marginal impact of location on Internet adoption

In this section, we estimate equation (1), focusing on testing between global village and urban density theories. We weight observations by the inverse probability that an establishment will appear in our sample. To be precise, the weight for each observation is the total number of establishments in a state/NAICS in Census County Business Patterns data divided by the number of establishments in the state/NAICS in our sample multiplied by controls for sampling the same establishment twice.

Table 5 shows the roles of population and density in the adoption decision. Part A presents the coefficients of the probit regressions. Part B presents the marginal effects. All probit regressions include dummy variables for 3-digit NAICS, the month the data were collected, survey type, survey type interacted with month, and whether or not the establishment was part of a multi-establishment firm. Employment and employment

squared were also included as controls. Population was measured at the MSA level and density at the county level.

For columns 1 and 5, we use non-urban (hereafter termed *rural*) state areas for the base. For columns 2, 3, 6, and 7, we include a "rural area" dummy for rural areas, since no meaningful population figures exist for these areas. In columns 4 and 8 we include population density for all urban and rural areas using low-density areas as the base.

## 5.1 The marginal impact of location

From Table 5, it is clear there is no support for the urban density theory in participation. Controlling for industry and firm characteristics, location size and density have little impact on the decision to adopt at the participation level. If anything, the effects of location size and density support global village theory, but the impact of geography is of limited economic and statistical significance. In column 1, we show that medium and large MSAs are 0.5% to 1.0% less likely to have adopted participation by the end of 2000. However, the effect is only significantly different from rural areas for medium MSAs. Moreover, this effect is only of marginal economic significance as participation rates average 88.6%.

In column 2, we identify the effects of size through a variable that captures the effects of increases in population in urban areas. Increases in population size decrease the probability of participation, though the effects are statistically insignificant. In column 3 we include a squared population term. In this formulation, the linear term remains statistically insignificant, while the squared term is significant, albeit very small. This model implies that the effects of population will turn negative once urban areas exceed 7.039 million, a threshold that is larger than all but the five largest urban areas. In column 4 we include dummies for population density. This alternative specification gives very similar results.

Variation in population density does not affect participation by more than 1%, and it is always statistically insignificant.

The effects of population size and density on enhancement support urban density theory. Column 5 in Table 5B shows that establishments in medium and large MSAs adopt enhancement at a rate 0.8% to 1.1% higher than rural areas. Column 8 shows that establishments in medium- and high-density regions adopt enhancement at a rate 1.0% to 1.5% more. All of these effects are statistically significant. They are economically significant in light of the average enhancement rates of 12.6%. While column 6 suggests that a linear population term has little effect on enhancement, column 7 shows that population will have a statistically and economically significant positive effect for all metropolitan areas below 8.8 million in size (all but New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago).

Together these results support the key prediction of GPT theory about the comparative relationship between complexity of application and geographic variance in use. The probability that an establishment adopts the Internet for enhancement is more sensitive to geographic variation in density than the similar probability for participation. We interpret this as evidence that the applications more dependent on third-party support and complementary services are most costly to deploy in less dense locations.

How does the variance in location contribution vary by city size? In Figures 1 and 2 we graph the marginal effect of location in the baseline probit in model (1) to reinforce the results of Table 5.<sup>27</sup> We divide locations into four types: large MSAs, medium MSAs, small MSAs, and statewide rural (non-MSA) regions. In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the kernel

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> This probit is not depicted in any table. We identify the effects of population size and density directly through the location-specific dummy variables.

density estimates of the effects of location on participation and enhancement, respectively. 28 We use Epanachnikov kernels with "optimal" bandwidths.

In Figure 1 small MSAs and rural areas have a fatter right tail, while the density for large MSAs reaches its peak below any of the three other classes of geographic areas. In all, this figure provides further support for global village theory: increases in local population size and density do not increase the likelihood of participation adoption. If anything, they lower it.

In Figure 2, it is clear that the density estimate for large MSAs stochastically dominates those for small and medium MSAs and rural areas. This provides a visual depiction of the results in Table 5 that urban density theory better describes the geographic diffusion of enhancement than global village theory.

Table 6 presents summary statistics on the marginal effects of the same regressions. Again, the results show that establishments in larger MSAs are less likely to adopt participation and more likely to adopt enhancement.

We checked our results for a variety of robustness issues. As noted, we were concerned that establishment location decisions might be endogenous with improvements in communications technology. We re-estimated the model using only establishments that had been added to the HH database prior to 1995, the year in which Internet technology began to diffuse widely to businesses. Although this restricted the size of our sample substantially (to 23,436 observations), the basic results remain the same. The correlation coefficients between our baseline marginal effects and those using pre-1995 data are 0.829 for participation and 0.997 for enhancement. Qualitative results did not change.

We tried a number of other robustness checks. For one, we worried about omitted variables. We experimented with a variety of different specifications by using different

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The omitted MSA is San Jose, the top MSA in adoption of enhancement.

location variables (e.g., CMSA dummies), different firm controls (e.g., revenue, private/public), and alternative measures of population size and density. We also worried about how weighting the probit model would affect our results. We tried weighting the probit regressions by 3-digit NAICS/states, 2-digit NAICS/MSAs, as well as no weighting at all. In all cases the results remained qualitatively the same; the correlation coefficients between our baseline coefficient estimates and the alternative specifications were between 0.88 and 0.95 for participation and 0.78 and 0.90 for enhancement.<sup>29</sup>

#### 5.2 Location and multi-establishment firms

Multi-establishment firms often adopt new communication technologies at some. but not all, of their establishments. Multi-establishment firms will choose to locate Internet technology in the least-cost locations, implying that the effects of greater population size and density (urban density) will be more important to adoption decisions for establishments that are part of multi-establishments firms. This will be particularly true for complex enhancement technologies, where co-invention costs are higher. In this section, we systematically examine how multi-establishment status changes the marginal returns to location. We find the results to be in the expected direction, but not sufficiently large to alter the evidence for or against urban density or global village theory.<sup>30</sup>

First, we show that multi-establishment status does predict adoption. The results in Tables 7a and 7b support the hypothesis that the effects of greater population size and density are larger (more positive) if the establishment is part of a multi-establishment firm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> We also explored whether systematic establishment differences across geographic locations are driving our results. Though unobservable establishment differences could play a role, we were unable to uncover any pronounced observable establishment differences. Using weighted data, establishments in large MSAs are larger (12.8% of establishments with >500 employees versus 9.0% for small MSAs and 9.9% for rural areas) and more likely to be multi-establishment (48.7% multi-establishment versus 43.9% for small MSAs and 33.4% for non-MSAs). However, when using unweighted data much of the differences disappear (12.7% of establishments in large MSAs >500 employees versus 12.1% in small MSAs 13.4% in rural areas; 46.3% of establishments in large MSAs multi-establishment versus 46.8% in small MSAs and 40.8% in rural areas). <sup>30</sup> To our knowledge, this study is the first to address how multi-establishment status affects technology adoption. Note, however, that our ability to do this comprehensively is restricted by our data. We do not observe all of an organization's establishments. We observe only those with more than 100 employees.

Equivalently, the effects of smaller population size and density are greater for single-establishment firms. This is particularly true for enhancement technologies.

Column 1 of Table 7b shows that when a multi-establishment dummy is interacted with MSA dummies the non-interacted medium and large MSA dummies now both have a statistically significant marginal effect of –1.3% and –1.0% respectively. There is no statistically or economically significant effect in the interaction terms themselves. When multi-establishment is interacted with population, there is a statistically significant but small marginal impact of 0.042% per 100,000-person increase in population. The effect of population itself has a more negative impact than in Table 5.32 Similar results hold using population density rather than size.

The economic significance of multi-establishment is larger for enhancement.

Interactions of multi-establishment dummies with population size and density weaken the positive effects of non-interacted population variables. In many cases marginal effects become smaller or less statistically significant. In all the columns the interaction terms suggest that the effects of population size and density are greater for multi-establishment firms.

The economic effects can be substantial. Columns 5 and 8 suggest that establishments located in large MSAs or densely populated counties and that are part of multi-establishment firms are 2.2% to 2.3% more likely to adopt enhancement than standalone establishments in the same locations. These marginal effects are sizable compared to typical enhancement rates of 13%. The marginal effects of interacting multi-establishment

This calculation is not shown in the table.

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These results do not reflect any collinearity between multi-establishment and urban areas. Multi-establishment dummies had a statistically and economically significant impact in the baseline regressions in Table 5; the marginal effect was between –2.6% and –2.8%. Moreover, the correlation between multi-establishment status and location in an MSA positive but small (0.0427).

with MSA population (in column 6) are statistically significant, but only 0.025% per 100,000 person increase in population.

The discussion above ignores potential simultaneity bias arising from establishment-level analysis of adoption decisions in multi-establishment firms. We extended our statistical model to include variables capturing the behavior of other establishments within the same firm. In particular, we added variables measuring the percentage and total of other establishments within the same firm adopting the dependent variable (e.g., participation or enhancement). Because these variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved factors affecting the decision to adopt participation and enhancement, we also used nonlinear instrumental variable techniques. For instruments, we used average population and density of other establishments in the same firm. These should be correlated with adoption decisions at the firm's other establishments, but not at the establishment of interest.

We first show whether our baseline estimates (without multi-establishment interactions) are robust to the inclusion of other establishment decisions. Appendix Table A.2 shows the marginal effects of probit regressions that add other establishment adoption decisions to the models in Table 5. These regressions are performed with and without IV. These robustness checks make little difference to the estimated relationship between population density and Internet adoption, our test for global village and urban density theory. Table A.2a shows that variables capturing the percentage of establishments with participation and enhancement come in positive and significant in weighted probit regressions, however their significance disappears once we instrument in Table A.2b. We interpret the probit regressions without IV as picking up unobserved heterogeneity, which is ultimately eliminated in the IV probit regressions. The new variables have little effect on

the population marginal effects. Moreover, statistical significance of our location variables is retained in the IV version of this model.

Similarly, Appendix Table A.3 shows that the inclusion of other establishments' decisions has almost no impact on the estimates of our multi-establishment interaction models in Table 7. The new variables have the same pattern as in Table A.2: positive and significant in probit regressions without IV, insignificant in probit regressions with IV. We conclude that simultaneity of decisions does not significantly bias our results.

## **6. Industry Composition**

The differences between the average adoption rates in Table 3 and the marginal effects in Table 5 show that the effects of location on participation and enhancement fall if we include controls for establishment size, industry, and firm status. In Table 3, large MSAs have almost a 15% higher participation rate and 5% higher enhancement rate than small MSAs. In Table 5, locating in a large MSA rather than a rural area reduces the probability of participation by 0.6% and increases the probability of enhancement by 1.1%.

The large differences in adoption rates between large and small urban areas in Table 3 reflect differences in industry composition across locations. Industry composition explains much more of the variation in participation and enhancement rates than location. Once industry is controlled for, the incremental contribution of location in the probit regressions is small. This is shown in Table 8. The pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> of a probit for participation including only location dummies is 0.1526, whereas the pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> of a probit with only industry dummies is 0.2251. Adding location dummies to a probit that includes industry dummies barely improves fit, from 0.2251 to 0.2339.

Enhancement displays a similar pattern. Location dummies explain only 0.0347 of the variation in enhancement, industry dummies explain 0.0591, and the combination of

industry and location dummies explains 0.0672. While there remains a great deal of unexplained variation in our results, we conclude that an establishment's industry explains more of the variation in Internet use than geographic location.

#### 6.1. What does industry composition explain?

The three theories that emphasize the importance of industry composition assert that leading industries concentrate in large urban areas. To test this hypothesis, we separated establishments by geographic location type (e.g., rural, small, medium, and large MSA) and calculated the kernel density of industry marginal effects for each type of location. The underlying marginal effects are the same across all four types of locations. However, the densities of each marginal effect differ because of differences in industry composition across locations. We did this for both participation and enhancement.

In Figure 3, we show the kernel density estimates of the marginal effects of industry by geographic area for participation.<sup>33</sup> Lead-user industries tend to be concentrated in large geographic areas. The average of the marginal effects of industry in rural and small MSAs is –18.7% and –20.2%, while the average of the marginal effects for medium and large MSAs are –18.8% and –16.9%. Except in comparing rural and medium MSAs, these averages are significantly different from one another at the 1% level. Large MSAs tend to have more lead-user industries, even for participation.

Figure 4 shows that lead users of enhancement are even more skewed toward large MSAs. Rural areas and small MSAs have the highest densities along the left tail of the distribution, whereas large and medium MSAs have higher densities along the right tail.

The average marginal effect of industry on enhancement adoption is increasing in location

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> All industry results are unweighted. The omitted industry is information and data processing (NAICS 514). We use Epanachnikov kernels with bandwidth of 0.05 for participation and 0.005 for enhancement. These are wider than "optimal" bandwidths. Optimal bandwidths fail in this case as there are thousands of observations but the only 81 possible values as there are 81 relevant 3-digit NAICS levels. Therefore the optimal bandwidth does almost no smoothing.

size: -8.0% in rural, -7.8% in small MSAs, -7.7% in medium MSAs, and -7.4% in large MSAs. Again, these averages are all significantly different from one another at the 1% level. The bulk of the variation in Table 3 reflects differences in industry composition between small and large MSAs, rather than other location-specific benefits of locating in large urban areas.

We conclude that large urban areas are comprised of establishments with a disproportionate tendency to be information intensive. To be concrete, within large MSAs, 27.5% of establishments are in industries that are part of the top quartile of adopters. compared to 19.0% of establishments in small MSAs. The industries in the upper quartile are traditionally information intensive, such as utilities, finance and insurance, company headquarters, professional and scientific services, electronics manufacturing, and wholesale trade.<sup>34</sup> The geographic dispersion of establishments from these industries favored large urban areas prior to the diffusion of the Internet and largely contributed to higher rates of participation and enhancement in large urban areas.

Two conclusions emerge. First, this supports the importance of controlling for industry composition when testing between global village and urban density theory. Second, inferences about the relationship between IT and economic activity are fraught with omitted variable biases in the absence of such controls. We note that this factor is missing from all existing analysis about the geography of Internet use.

## **6.2.** Are industry and location complements or substitutes?

Table 8 and Figures 3 and 4 suggest that industry composition theory explains a major part of establishment decisions to adopt Internet technology. However, they are unable to represent whether industry and location effects are complements or substitutes. IT-intensive industries benefit disproportionately from spillovers and other pooled

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> For more detail, see Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2002).

resources in large urban areas; however, these industries may have expertise in-house that substitutes for the thicker labor markets associated with large cities.

To examine the industry-agglomeration substitutes and complements hypotheses, we rerun the probit regressions in Table 5 with additional variables controlling for (1) whether the establishment is in a lead-user industry and (2) interactions of this lead user dummy with MSA size dummies. We define lead-user industries in one of two ways: (1) the top quartile of participation or enhancement adopters among 3-digit NAICS industries in our study or (2) the Department of Commerce (2002) top 15 IT-using industries as reported in Daveri and Mascotto (2002). [xx Avi, I changed this slightly, is this still correct? I got it from p. 5 of their paper xx] Both measures of IT intensity have strengths and weaknesses. The measure based on the top quartile selects on the dependent variable; the measure from Daveri and Mascotto is based on a more general measure of IT intensity than the Internet. Consequently, these are not final tests. We present these results as descriptive evidence that may support either a complement or substitute relationship between industry and location effects,. To further supplement our analysis, we later examine whether establishments in lead user industries (defined by high marginal effects), also tend to be located in favorable locations (locations with high marginal effects). In other words, we examine whether "good" industries are located in "good" locations.

Using the data on lead Internet adopters, Table 9A shows that there is little evidence of a complementary relationship between industry and location in participation; if anything, they are substitutes. An establishment in a top-25 NAICS and large MSA is 2.6 percent more likely to adopt participation than an otherwise equivalent top-25 establishment in a rural area. However, large MSAs are 2.8 percent less likely to adopt than small MSAs, although the difference is not statistically significant. The NAICS-level controls likely explain the lack of significance on the IT-intensive industry dummy (under

both definitions). Because they are based on a more general measure of IT use, industry-location interactions in Table 9B are less significant than in Table 9A. However, they tell exactly the same story. An establishment in a lead-user SIC and large MSA is 1.4 percent less likely to adopt than an otherwise equivalent establishment in a small MSA.

In contrast, Table 9 shows a strong complementary relationship between industry and location for enhancement. Table 9A shows that an establishment in a top-25 NAICS and large MSA is 20.0 and 27.3 percent more likely to adopt enhancement than an otherwise equivalent top-25 establishment in a rural or small MSA, respectively. Such an establishment is equally likely to adopt enhancement as an equivalent establishment in a medium MSA. The results in based on a more general measure of IT-intensity are again weaker, but tell the same general story. Table 9B shows that an establishment in a lead-user industry and large MSA is 0.2 percent more likely to adopt enhancement than an otherwise equivalent establishment in a small MSA. Moreover, the positive coefficient on the interaction of lead-user industry and large MSA is the only statistically significant interaction in the regression. That is, as suggested by the industry-agglomeration complements theory, industry and location are complements for complex applications, but have little relationship for simple applications.

As an alternative way of examining whether industry and location effects tend to complement or substitute one another, we compare median industries by IT use across cities. This is not an explicit test for complementarities, but rather another way of showing whether establishments in IT-intensive industries tend also to be located in favorable industries.

We calculate correlations between the marginal effects of the median industry within each urban area with those of the urban areas themselves. The results are consistent with our findings in Table 9. For participation, the marginal contribution of the median

industry in a location is uncorrelated with the marginal contribution of the location itself ( $\rho$ =-0.0214). However, this result disguises a large difference between large and medium MSAs on the one hand and small MSAs and rural areas on the other. The correlation between the marginal contribution of median industry and location is significantly positive ( $\rho$ =0.307) for large and medium MSAs but significantly negative ( $\rho$ =-0.211) for small MSAs and rural areas. For larger population locations, good cities do have good industries for participation; yet for smaller areas the opposite is true.

For enhancement, there do seem to be complementarities between cities and locations ( $\rho$ =0.161). These complementarities do not vary much by city size. Regardless of size, good industries are in good cities and good cities are dominated by good industries. Cities and IT appear to be complements for enhancement, but not in the case of participation, especially in low population areas. This is consistent with the industry-agglomeration complements theory, which emphasizes complementarity for complex applications. We interpret this complementarity as a likely result of spillover effects in using frontier technologies. The exception is as interesting as the more general finding. In low population areas, favorable locations likely only help adoption in firms without in-house expertise. In that case, location and industry become substitutes. This result is potentially consistent with industry-agglomeration substitutes theory, which is most relevant for small urban areas.

#### 7. Conclusions

Has the Internet realized its promise of reducing the importance of location to economic activity? In this paper we tested competing views by examining hard data about the short-run decisions of firms to invest in the Internet.

By 2000, participation activities such as email and web browsing had diffused almost everywhere. For these simple technologies, there was no evidence that urban

density held: industry composition explains the higher levels of participation adoption in urban areas. Once industry composition was controlled for, we found that the variation across locations is best explained by the global village theory. Moreover, we found some evidence of substitution between IT-intensity and location density: IT-intensive users in rural locations were the most likely to adopt participation technologies. For this technology with low adaptation costs, we find little evidence of complementarities between industry and location.

For complex enhancement technologies, adoption behavior is best explained by urban density theory. We find evidence of complementarities between industry and location effects in the adoption of enhancement: IT-intensive firms found greater benefits than other firms from pooled resources in large cities.

The geographic variation in use was consistent with GPT theory: enhancement costs are more sensitive to variation in density than are participation costs. Adopters of participation faced low technical hurdles to implementation, while adopters of enhancement faced high costs. Establishments overcame these costs because they had experience with overcoming technical and co-invention costs, had access to rich complementary resources through local markets, or both.

Did the Internet exacerbate geographic inequalities, diffusing disproportionately to urban areas with complementary technical and knowledge resources? Our research shows that the answer is no, even for complex applications that enhance business computing processes. More precisely, there were forces leading to concentration of complex applications in urban areas, but these were not concentrated in a few cities. Users of complex applications are widely dispersed to many industries.

Of more relevance to economic growth, the geographic pattern of adoption for enhancement is quite understandable as an economic matter if these applications have high value and potentially high co-invention costs, which differ depending on local conditions. In smaller MSAs and rural areas, thin technical labor markets alone could drive up costs of operating facilities employing frontier Internet technology. These effects are particularly pronounced for multi-establishment firms. Because the investment is linked to competitive settings, multi-establishment organizations, if they had a choice, would implement new business processes in the more hospitable settings of major urban areas. In addition, multi-establishment organizations would hesitate to open their own complex Internet facilities in rural areas until the costs are lowered. In any case, variation in the availability of complementary resources would lead to more use of enhancement in major urban areas. Particularly for multi-establishment organizations, the outcome is not alarming at all.

Our findings provide several avenues for future research. First, our conclusions apply only to medium to large establishments. We defer to future research to examine small establishments and newly founded firms, who may face a different array of benefits, and may have diminished access to internal resources for idiosyncratic adaptation costs. It is already apparent from existing papers that participation is lower on average in small firms, <sup>35</sup> so we speculate that smaller firms will be more sensitive to geographic variation in local complementary resources than found here.

Second, our findings suggest broadly that variations in co-invention costs across technologies and locations shaped the diffusion of Internet technology. Research on the role of co-invention costs on Internet diffusion has been hampered by the binary nature of the adoption decision considered in many studies, including this one. Future work should analyze variations in firm co-invention costs, emphasizing in particular the impact of variation in labor market conditions, spillovers, and markets for technical support.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> For the beginnings of such research, see Atrostic and Gates (2001) on manufacturing establishments, and Buckley and Montes (2002) or Bitler (2002) for analysis of small business computer use.

Third, our findings have implications for variation in the dollar value of investment across location and industries and the net returns from those investments. The standard diffusion model of adoption implies that magnitudes of investment should follow patterns similar to the patterns for the binary adoption decision. Hence, we speculate that the flow of investment dollars to correlate positively with the rankings of location and industries uncovered in this study. Related, if this model is correct, the investment dollars affiliated with the commercialization of the Internet were widely dispersed throughout locations and industries in the United States. This speculation awaits confirmation with data about investment behavior beyond adoption.

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Table 1

**Predictions of Alternative Hypotheses** 

Hypothesis	Prediction
Global Village	$dNB/dx_i < 0$
Urban Density	$dNB/dx_i > 0$
General Purpose	$dNB/dx_i$ for enhancement $> dNB/dx_i$ for participation
Technology	
Industry Composition	$dNB/dx_i = 0; dNB/dz_i > 0$
(IC)	
Industry-	$dNB/dz_i > 0$ , $dNB/dx_i > 0$ , and $d^2NB/dx_idz_i > 0$
Agglomeration	
Complements	
Industry-	$dNB/dz_i > 0$ , $dNB/dx_i > 0$ , and $d^2NB/dx_idz_i < 0$
Agglomeration	
Substitutes	

 $x_i$  describes geographic conditions such as population size and density.  $z_i$  describes the IT-intensity of an industry.

Table 2
National Internet Adoption Rates (in percentages)

	Weighted	Unweighted
	Average	Average
Participation	88.6%	80.7%
_		
Enhancement	12.6%	11.2%
Enhancement & Experimenting	23.2%	18.1%
with Enhancement		

Table 3
Average Adoption by Size of Metropolitan Statistical Area

Population	Average Participation	Standard	Average Enhancement	Standard	Number
		Error		Error	of Areas
Non-MSA	85.1%	0.1%	10.6%	0.2%	49
<250,000	75.5%	0.2%	9.9%	0.3%	143
250,000-1 million	84.9%	0.2%	11.2%	0.3%	116
> 1 million	90.4%	0.1%	14.7%	0.2%	57

41

Table 4a: Participation Among Metropolitan Statistical Areas with Over One Million People

	Table 4a: Participation Among Metropolitan S	Statistic			Over C		on Peo	
Avg. Rank	City	Avg. Rate	Std. Err. Rate	Marg. Rank	Marg. Coef.	Std. Err. Coef.	Obs.	Population
1	San FranciscoOaklandSan Jose, CA	96.4%		7	0 (base)	N/A	2135	7,039,362
2	DenverBoulderGreeley, CO	95.9%		43	-0.067	0.027	940	
3	ClevelandAkron, OH	94.8%	0.6%	23	-0.038	0.021	1099	2,945,831
4	SeattleTacomaBremerton, WA	93.9%	0.5%	3	0.025	0.015	1012	3,554,760
5	Salt Lake CityOgden, UT	93.5%	0.8%	6	0.007	0.019	535	
6	San Antonio, TX	93.3%	0.8%	1	0.035	0.021	395	
7	ProvidenceFall RiverWarwick, RIMA	93.0%	1.2%	24	-0.038	0.032	290	
8	Grand RapidsMuskegonHolland, MI	93.0%	0.7%	4	0.012	0.021	503	, ,
9	MinneapolisSt. Paul, MNWI	92.7%	0.5%	10	-0.011	0.017	1411	2,968,806
10	Los AngelesRiversideOrange County, CA	92.5%	0.4%	38	-0.061	0.017		16,373,645
11	Kansas City, MOKS	92.2%	0.6%	21	-0.035	0.025	753	1,776,062
12	AustinSan Marcos, TX	92.1%	0.7%	2	0.033	0.026	344	
13	DallasFort Worth, TX	92.1%	0.5%	36	-0.058	0.019	1720	5,221,801
14	PortlandSalem, ORWA	92.1%	0.6%	5	0.009	0.019	776	
15	HoustonGalvestonBrazoria, TX	91.7%	0.6%	17	-0.032	0.018	1413	
16	PhoenixMesa, AZ	91.6%	0.7%	13	-0.022	0.018	988	3,251,876
17	RaleighDurhamChapel Hill, NC	91.6%	0.9%	9	-0.004	0.028	398	
18	Columbus, OH	91.5%	0.9%	28	-0.048	0.025	574	
19	MilwaukeeRacine, WI	91.5%	0.7%	14	-0.023	0.023	855	
20	San Diego, CA	91.5%	0.7%	32	-0.053	0.023	738	
21	Detroit—Ann ArborFlint, MI	91.4%	0.6%	42	-0.067	0.023	1621	5,456,428
22	Indianapolis, IN	91.3%	0.8%	22	-0.036	0.024	646	
23	GreensboroWinston-SalemHigh Point, NC	91.1%	0.9%	18	-0.032	0.024	570	
24	Atlanta, GA	90.9%	0.6%	40	-0.052	0.024		4,112,198
25	MiamiFort Lauderdale, FL	90.9%	0.7%	35	-0.057	0.024	1010	
26	CharlotteGastoniaRock Hill, NC—SC	90.7%	0.9%	46	-0.083	0.029	618	
27	Boston—WorcesterLawrence, MANHMECT	90.6%	0.5%	12	-0.022	0.025	2231	5,819,100
28	ChicagoGaryKenosha, ILIN—WI	90.5%	0.4%	27	-0.022	0.015	3431	9,157,540
29	New York—Northern NJLong Island, NYNJCTPA	90.5%	0.4%	30	-0.050	0.015		21,199,865
30	WashingtonBaltimore, DCMD—VAWV	90.4%	0.5%	20	-0.034	0.013	2222	7,608,070
31	Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA—NJDEMD	90.3%	0.5%	16	-0.034	0.017	1745	
32	Rochester, NY	90.3%	1.0%	19	-0.033	0.028		1,098,201
	Hartford, CT	90.2%		15	-0.024			1,183,110
34	Oklahoma City, OK	90.2%	1.1%	8	-0.002	0.024		1,083,346
35	Memphis, TNARMS	90.0%	1.0%	26	-0.045	0.027	437	
36	Louisville, KYIN	89.9%	1.0%	25	-0.044	0.027		1,025,598
37	CincinnatiHamilton, OHKY—IN	89.7%	0.8%	41	-0.066		772	1,979,202
38	St. Louis, MOIL	89.7%	0.7%	11	-0.020			2,603,607
39	Pittsburgh, PA	89.1%	0.8%	34	-0.020	0.023	727	2,358,695
40	BuffaloNiagara Falls, NY	88.5%		31	-0.051	0.023		1,170,111
41	TampaSt. PetersburgClearwater, FL	88.4%		33	-0.054			2,395,997
42	Jacksonville, FL	87.6%	1.3%	47	-0.094			1,100,491
43	Las Vegas, NVAZ	87.2%	1.2%	48	-0.106		417	1,563,282
44	SacramentoYolo, CA	87.0%	1.2%	45	-0.070		427	1,796,857
45	NorfolkVirginia BeachNewport News, VANC	86.9%	1.2%	49	-0.110	0.032	374	
46	New Orleans, LA	86.0%	1.1%	37	-0.06	0.031	386	
47	West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL	85.9%	1.2%	29	-0.049	0.029	299	1,131,184
48	Orlando, FL	85.5%	1.0%	44	-0.067	0.025	622	1,644,561
49	Nashville, TN	84.6%	1.1%	39	-0.062	0.028		1,231,311

Table 4b: Enhancement Among Metropolitan Statistical Areas with Over One Million People

Avg. Rank         City         Avg. Rank         Sed. Err. Rank         Marg. Rank         Coc. Coc. Coc. Coc. Coc. 1         Obs. Population           1         Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO         18.3%         1.3%         3.0.016         0.015         940         22,815,00           3         Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT         16.7%         1.7%         0.0%         15.0 (bos.)         N/A         2135         7,039,362           5         Houston-Gliveston-Brazoria, IX         15.7%         1.0%         10.0         0.00         0.012         1411         2,068,806           6         Adanta, GA         15.4%         1.0%         20.008         0.011         1426         4,112,108           8         Dallas-Fort Worth, TX         15.3%         1.0%         2         0.00         0.011         1720         5,221,801           10         Portland-Salem, OR-WA         15.1%         1.3%         4         0.013         0.01         1712         5,221,801           11         Portland-Salem, OR-WA         15.1%         1.3%         4         0.01         0.01         172         2,265,223           12         Portland-Salem, OR-WA         15.7%         1.3%         1.5         0.013         0.01		Table 4b: Enhancement Among Metropolitan	Statist			th Over		<u>llion Pe</u>	ople
Denver		City						Obs.	Population
2 San Francisco—Oakland—San Jose, CA	1	Denver—BoulderGreeley, CO	18.3%	1.3%		0.016	0.015	940	2,581,506
3         Salt Lake City—Ogden, UT         16.7%         1.7%         6         0.013         0.017         535         13.33.914           4         Minneapolis—St. Paul, MN-WI         15.9%         1.0%         10         0.003         0.012         1413         2.968,806           5         Houston—Galveston—Brazoria, TX         15.7%         1.0%         11         0.003         0.012         1413         4.669,571           6         Allanta, GA         15.4%         12.0%         2.0         0.020         0.021         339         1.083,346           8         Dallas—Fort Worth, IX         15.3%         1996         4         0.013         0.020         339         1.592,381           10         Portland—Salem, OR-WA         15.1%         1.3%         5         0.013         0.020         335         1.592,381           10         Portland—Salem, OR-WA         15.1%         1.3%         5         0.013         0.002         335         1.592,381           11         Providence—Fall River—Warwick, RI-MA         14.4%         1.2%         2.000         0.016         341         1.294,5831           12         Austin—San Marcos, TX         1.47%         1.2%         21         0.00	2	San FranciscoOaklandSan Jose, CA	17.0%	0.9%	15	0 (base)		2135	7,039,362
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX	3	Salt Lake CityOgden, UT	16.7%	1.7%				535	1,333,914
HoustonGalvestonBrazoria, TX	4	MinneapolisSt. Paul, MNWI	15.9%	1.0%	10	0.003		1411	2,968,806
6         Atlanta, GA         1,54%         1,09%         26         -0,008         0,011         1426         4,112,108           8         Dallas-Fort Worth, TX         15,3%         0,9%         19         -0,003         0,011         120         5,221,801           9         San Antonio, TX         15,3%         1,99%         4         0,013         0,002         395         1,592,632           10         Portland-Salem, OR-WA         15,1%         1,3%         5         0,013         0,001         707         2,265,233           11         Providence-Fall River—Warwick, RI-MA         14,9%         2,2%         7         0,010         0,024         290         1,188,613           12         Austin-San Marcos, TX         14,7%         1,2%         22         -0,004         0,014         1099         2,955,991           13         Cleveland-Akron, OH         14,7%         1,2%         1,2%         0,000         0,015         81,249,763           14         Tampa-St. Petersburg—Clearwater, FL         14,0%         1,3%         8         0,000         0,015         81,22,395,997           14         Tampa-St. Petersburg—Clearwater, FL         14,0%         1,3%         1,2%         0,000	5	HoustonGalvestonBrazoria, TX	15.7%	1.0%	11	0.003		1413	
7   Oklahoma City, OK   15.4%   2.0%   2   0.020   0.021   339   1.083,346     8   DallasFort Worth, TX   15.3%   0.9%   19   0.003   0.011   1720   5.221,801     9   San Antonio, TX   15.3%   1.9%   4   0.013   0.020   395   1.592,383     10   PortlandSalem, ORWA   15.1%   13.3%   5   0.013   0.019   776   2.265,223     11   ProvidenceFall River-Warwick, RIMA   14.9%   2.2%   7   0.010   0.024   290   1.188,613     12   AustinSan Marcos, TX   14.7%   1.9%   2.7   0.009   0.016   344   1.249,763     13   ClevelandAkton, OH   14.7%   1.2%   21   0.004   0.014   1099   2.945,831     14   TampaSt. Petersburg Clearwater, FI.   14.6%   1.3%   8   0.009   0.015   812   2.395,997     15   Memphis, TNARMS   14.5%   1.8%   14   0.002   0.021   437   1.135,614     16   Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA   14.5%   1.8%   14   0.002   0.012   1012   3.554,700     17   Hartford, CT   14.4%   1.6%   2.5   0.008   0.016   500   1.183,110     18   San Diego, CA   14.3%   1.3%   23   0.005   0.014   772   1.979,202     10   Cincinnati-Hamilton, OHKY-IN   14.2%   1.3%   24   0.005   0.014   772   1.979,202     10   Cincinnati-Hamilton, OHWAWV   14.2%   1.3%   24   0.005   0.010   2222   7.088,070     12   ChicagoGaryKenosha, IIINWI   14.1%   0.7%   17   0.002   0.009   3431   9.157,546     13   Deston	6	Atlanta, GA	15.4%	1.0%	26	-0.008		1426	4,112,198
Sam Antonio, TX	7	Oklahoma City, OK	15.4%	2.0%	2			339	
9 San Antonio, TX	8	DallasFort Worth, TX	15.3%	0.9%	19	-0.003	0.011	1720	5,221,801
10   PortlandSalem, ORWA	9	San Antonio, TX	15.3%	1.9%	4			395	1,592,383
11   Providence-Fall River—Warwick, RI-MA	10	PortlandSalem, ORWA	15.1%	1.3%	5			776	2,265,223
13   Cleveland—Akron, OH	11	ProvidenceFall River—Warwick, RIMA	14.9%	2.2%	7			290	
13   Cleveland—Akron, OH	12		14.7%	1.9%	27	-0.009	0.016	344	
14   Tampa~St. Petersburg—Clearwater, FL	13	ClevelandAkron, OH	14.7%	1.2%	21	-0.004	0.014	1099	
15   Memphis, TN-AR-MS	14	TampaSt. Petersburg—Clearwater, FL	14.6%	1.3%	8			812	
16	15		14.5%	1.8%	14	0.002		437	
Hartford, CT	16	SeattleTacomaBremerton, WA	14.5%	1.2%	16			1012	3,554,760
18	17	Hartford, CT	14.4%	1.6%	25			500	
19	18	San Diego, CA	14.3%	1.3%	23			738	
Washington-Baltimore, DC—MD—VA—WV	19	•	14.2%	1.3%	24			772	
21   ChicagoGaryKenosha, IL—INWI   14.1%   0.7%   17   -0.002   0.009   3431   9,157,540	20	WashingtonBaltimore, DCMDVAWV	14.2%	0.8%	22			2222	
22   Rochester, NY   14.1%   1.9%   18   -0.003   0.018   373   1,098,201	21		14.1%	0.7%	17			3431	
BostonWorcesterLawrence, MANHMECT   13.9%   0.8%   20   -0.004   0.011   2231   5,819,100	22				18				
24         DetroitAnn ArborFlint, MI         13.8%         0.9%         39         -0.016         0.010         1621         5,456,428           25         Kansas City, MOKS         13.7%         1.3%         35         -0.014         0.013         753         1,776,062           26         RaleighDurhamChapel Hill, NC         13.7%         1.7%         31         -0.012         0.017         398         1,187,941           27         Pittsburgh, PA         13.6%         1.3%         13         0.003         0.015         727         2,258,695           28         Indianapolis, IN         13.6%         1.4%         41         -0.019         0.014         646         1,607,486           29         Charlotte-GastoniaRock Hill, NCSC         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           30         West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL         13.6%         2.0%         12         0.003         0.025         299         1,131,184           31         Los AngelesRiversideGrange County, CA         13.5%         0.6%         37         -0.015         0.008         409         16,373,645           32         MismiFort Lauderdale, FL         13.5									
25         Kansas City, MO-KS         13.7%         1.3%         35         -0.014         0.013         753         1,776,062           26         RaleighDurhamChapel Hill, NC         13.7%         1.7%         31         -0.012         0.017         398         1,187,941           27         Pittsburgh, PA         13.6%         1.3%         13         0.003         0.015         727         2,358,695           28         Indianapolis, IN         13.6%         1.3%         14         -0.019         0.014         646         1,607,486           29         Charlotte—GastoniaRock Hill, NCSC         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           30         West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL         13.6%         1.0%         12         0.003         0.025         299         1,131,184           31         Los AngelesRiverside—Orange County, CA         13.5%         0.6%         37         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           32         Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD </td <td>24</td> <td>·</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	24	·							
26         RaleighDurhamChapel Hill, NC         13.7%         1.7%         31         -0.012         0.017         398         1,187,941           27         Pittsburgh, PA         13.6%         1.3%         13         0.003         0.015         727         2,358,695           28         Indianapolis, IN         13.6%         1.4%         41         -0.019         0.014         646         1,607,486           29         Charlotte-GastoniaRock Hill, NCSC         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           30         West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           31         Los AngelesRiversideOrange County, CA         13.5%         0.6%         37         -0.015         0.008         409         16,373,645           32         MiamiFort Lauderdale, FL         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         409         16,373,645           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         475         21,199,865           34         Philadelphia-Wi	25	·		1.3%					
27         Pittsburgh, PA         13.6%         1.3%         13         0.003         0.015         727         2,358,695           28         Indianapolis, IN         13.6%         1.4%         41         -0.019         0.014         646         1,607,486           29         Charlotte—GastoniaRock Hill, NCSC         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           30         West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL         13.6%         2.0%         12         0.003         0.025         299         1,131,184           31         Los AngelesRiverside—Orange County, CA         13.5%         0.6%         37         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           32         Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL         13.5%         1.1%         33         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         477         21,199,865           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.3%         0.9%         44         -0.021         0.009         1745         6,188,463           35		•							
28         Indianapolis, IN         13.6%         1.4%         41         -0.019         0.014         646         1,607,486           29         Charlotte—GastoniaRock Hill, NCSC         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           30         West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL         13.6%         2.0%         12         0.003         0.025         299         1,131,184           31         Los AngelesRiverside—Orange County, CA         13.5%         0.6%         37         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           32         Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL         13.5%         1.1%         33         -0.015         0.008         4075         21,199,865           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.3%         0.9%         44         -0.021         0.009         1745         6,188,463           35         St. Louis, MOIL         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           36         Louisville, KYIN         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         Columbus, OH									
29         Charlotte—Gastonia–Rock Hill, NC–SC         13.6%         1.5%         29         -0.010         0.014         618         1,499,293           30         West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL         13.6%         2.0%         12         0.003         0.025         299         1,131,184           31         Los AngelesRiverside—Orange County, CA         13.5%         0.6%         37         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           32         Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         4099         16,373,645           33         New YorkNorthern NJLong Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         4775         21,199,865           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.3%         0.9%         44         -0.021         0.009         1745         6,188,463           35         St. Louis, MOIL         13.2%         1.2%         28         -0.009         0.013         936         2,603,607           36         Louisville, KYIN         13.0%         1.5%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         <		_							
30   West Palm BeachBoca Raton, FL   13.6%   2.0%   12   0.003   0.025   299   1,131,184     31   Los AngelesRiverside—Orange County, CA   13.5%   0.6%   37   -0.015   0.008   4099   16,373,645     32   Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL   13.5%   1.1%   33   -0.013   0.011   1010   3,876,380     33   New YorkNorthern NJLong Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA   13.5%   0.6%   36   -0.015   0.008   4775   21,199,865     34   Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD   13.3%   0.9%   44   -0.021   0.009   1745   6,188,463     35   St. Louis, MOIL   13.2%   1.2%   28   -0.009   0.013   936   2,603,607     36   Louisville, KYIN   13.2%   1.6%   9   0.006   0.024   448   1,025,598     37   Columbus, OH   13.0%   1.5%   30   -0.011   0.018   574   1,540,157     38   Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY   12.9%   1.7%   42   -0.019   0.014   393   1,170,111     39   Phoenix—Mesa, AZ   12.4%   1.1%   34   -0.014   0.012   988   3,251,876     40   Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC   12.2%   1.4%   43   -0.020   0.015   570   1,251,509     41   Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI   12.0%   1.5%   47   -0.031   0.012   503   1,088,514     42   New Orleans, LA   11.7%   1.2%   38   -0.016   0.014   855   1,689,572     43   Milwaukee—Racine, WI   11.7%   1.2%   38   -0.016   0.014   855   1,689,572     44   Nashville, TN   11.7%   1.5%   32   -0.012   0.016   466   1,231,311     45   Jacksonville, FL   11.3%   1.7%   48   -0.034   0.014   373   1,100,491     46   SacramentoYolo, CA   11.8%   1.6%   1   0.041   0.050   427   1,796,857     47   NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC   10.8%   1.7%   45   -0.021   0.017   374   1,569,541     48   Orlando, FL   10.5%   1.3%   46   -0.027   0.012   622   1,644,561		*							
Los AngelesRiverside—Orange County, CA   13.5%   0.6%   37   -0.015   0.008   4099   16,373,645   32   Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL   13.5%   1.1%   33   -0.013   0.011   1010   3,876,380   33   New YorkNorthern NJLong Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA   13.5%   0.6%   36   -0.015   0.008   4775   21,199,865   34   Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD   13.3%   0.9%   44   -0.021   0.009   1745   6,188,463   35   St. Louis, MOIL   13.2%   1.2%   28   -0.009   0.013   936   2,603,607   36   Louisville, KYIN   13.2%   1.6%   9   0.006   0.024   448   1,025,598   37   Columbus, OH   13.0%   1.5%   30   -0.011   0.018   574   1,540,157   38   Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY   12.9%   1.7%   42   -0.019   0.014   393   1,170,111   39   Phoenix—Mesa, AZ   12.4%   1.1%   34   -0.014   0.012   988   3,251,876   40   Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC   12.2%   1.4%   43   -0.020   0.015   570   1,251,509   41   Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI   12.0%   1.5%   47   -0.031   0.012   503   1,088,514   42   New Orleans, LA   11.9%   1.7%   40   -0.018   0.016   386   1,337,726   43   MilwaukeeRacine, WI   11.7%   1.2%   38   -0.016   0.014   855   1,689,572   44   Nashville, TN   11.7%   1.5%   32   -0.012   0.016   466   1,231,311   45   Jacksonville, FL   11.3%   1.7%   48   -0.034   0.014   373   1,100,491   46   SacramentoYolo, CA   11.8%   1.6%   1   0.041   0.050   427   1,796,857   47   NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC   10.8%   1.7%   45   -0.021   0.017   374   1,569,541   48   Orlando, FL   10.5%   1.3%   46   -0.027   0.012   622   1,644,561		·							
32         Miami—Fort Lauderdale, FL         13.5%         1.1%         33         -0.013         0.011         1010         3,876,380           33         New YorkNorthern NJLong Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         4775         21,199,865           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.3%         0.9%         44         -0.021         0.009         1745         6,188,463           35         St. Louis, MOIL         13.2%         1.2%         28         -0.009         0.013         936         2,603,607           36         Louisville, KYIN         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         Columbus, OH         13.0%         1.5%         30         -0.011         0.018         574         1,540,157           38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC		,							
33         New YorkNorthern NJLong Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA         13.5%         0.6%         36         -0.015         0.008         4775         21,199,865           34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.3%         0.9%         44         -0.021         0.009         1745         6,188,463           35         St. Louis, MOIL         13.2%         1.2%         28         -0.009         0.013         936         2,603,607           36         Louisville, KYIN         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         Columbus, OH         13.0%         1.5%         30         -0.011         0.018         574         1,540,157           38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI	32								
34         Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PANJDEMD         13.3%         0.9%         44         -0.021         0.009         1745         6,188,463           35         St. Louis, MOIL         13.2%         1.2%         28         -0.009         0.013         936         2,603,607           36         Louisville, KYIN         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         Columbus, OH         13.0%         1.5%         30         -0.011         0.018         574         1,540,157           38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand Rapids—Muskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9% <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>									
35         St. Louis, MOIL         13.2%         1.2%         28         -0.009         0.013         936         2,603,607           36         Louisville, KYIN         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         Columbus, OH         13.0%         1.5%         30         -0.011         0.018         574         1,540,157           38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38					44			1745	
36         Louisville, KYIN         13.2%         1.6%         9         0.006         0.024         448         1,025,598           37         Columbus, OH         13.0%         1.5%         30         -0.011         0.018         574         1,540,157           38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38         -0.016         0.014         855         1,689,572           44         Nashville, TN         11.7%         1.5%         32					28			936	
37         Columbus, OH         13.0%         1.5%         30         -0.011         0.018         574         1,540,157           38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38         -0.016         0.014         855         1,689,572           44         Nashville, TN         11.7%         1.5%         32         -0.012         0.016         466         1,231,311           45         Jacksonville, FL         11.3%         1.7%         48		·							
38         Buffalo—Niagara Falls, NY         12.9%         1.7%         42         -0.019         0.014         393         1,170,111           39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38         -0.016         0.014         855         1,689,572           44         Nashville, TN         11.7%         1.5%         32         -0.012         0.016         466         1,231,311           45         Jacksonville, FL         11.3%         1.7%         48         -0.034         0.014         373         1,100,491           46         SacramentoYolo, CA         11.8%         1.6%         1 <td>37</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	37								
39         Phoenix—Mesa, AZ         12.4%         1.1%         34         -0.014         0.012         988         3,251,876           40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38         -0.016         0.014         855         1,689,572           44         Nashville, TN         11.7%         1.5%         32         -0.012         0.016         466         1,231,311           45         Jacksonville, FL         11.3%         1.7%         48         -0.034         0.014         373         1,100,491           46         SacramentoYolo, CA         11.8%         1.6%         1         0.041         0.050         427         1,796,857           47         NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC         10.5%         1.3%		,							
40         Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC         12.2%         1.4%         43         -0.020         0.015         570         1,251,509           41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38         -0.016         0.014         855         1,689,572           44         Nashville, TN         11.7%         1.5%         32         -0.012         0.016         466         1,231,311           45         Jacksonville, FL         11.3%         1.7%         48         -0.034         0.014         373         1,100,491           46         SacramentoYolo, CA         11.8%         1.6%         1         0.041         0.050         427         1,796,857           47         NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC         10.8%         1.7%         45         -0.021         0.017         374         1,569,541           48         Orlando, FL         10.5%         1.3%	39							988	
41         Grand RapidsMuskegon—Holland, MI         12.0%         1.5%         47         -0.031         0.012         503         1,088,514           42         New Orleans, LA         11.9%         1.7%         40         -0.018         0.016         386         1,337,726           43         MilwaukeeRacine, WI         11.7%         1.2%         38         -0.016         0.014         855         1,689,572           44         Nashville, TN         11.7%         1.5%         32         -0.012         0.016         466         1,231,311           45         Jacksonville, FL         11.3%         1.7%         48         -0.034         0.014         373         1,100,491           46         SacramentoYolo, CA         11.8%         1.6%         1         0.041         0.050         427         1,796,857           47         NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC         10.8%         1.7%         45         -0.021         0.017         374         1,569,541           48         Orlando, FL         10.5%         1.3%         46         -0.027         0.012         622         1,644,561	40	Greensboro—Winston-Salem—High Point, NC							
42       New Orleans, LA       11.9%       1.7%       40       -0.018       0.016       386       1,337,726         43       MilwaukeeRacine, WI       11.7%       1.2%       38       -0.016       0.014       855       1,689,572         44       Nashville, TN       11.7%       1.5%       32       -0.012       0.016       466       1,231,311         45       Jacksonville, FL       11.3%       1.7%       48       -0.034       0.014       373       1,100,491         46       SacramentoYolo, CA       11.8%       1.6%       1       0.041       0.050       427       1,796,857         47       NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC       10.8%       1.7%       45       -0.021       0.017       374       1,569,541         48       Orlando, FL       10.5%       1.3%       46       -0.027       0.012       622       1,644,561		Ę ,							
43       MilwaukeeRacine, WI       11.7%       1.2%       38       -0.016       0.014       855       1,689,572         44       Nashville, TN       11.7%       1.5%       32       -0.012       0.016       466       1,231,311         45       Jacksonville, FL       11.3%       1.7%       48       -0.034       0.014       373       1,100,491         46       SacramentoYolo, CA       11.8%       1.6%       1       0.041       0.050       427       1,796,857         47       NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC       10.8%       1.7%       45       -0.021       0.017       374       1,569,541         48       Orlando, FL       10.5%       1.3%       46       -0.027       0.012       622       1,644,561		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			40				
44       Nashville, TN       11.7%       1.5%       32       -0.012       0.016       466       1,231,311         45       Jacksonville, FL       11.3%       1.7%       48       -0.034       0.014       373       1,100,491         46       SacramentoYolo, CA       11.8%       1.6%       1       0.041       0.050       427       1,796,857         47       NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC       10.8%       1.7%       45       -0.021       0.017       374       1,569,541         48       Orlando, FL       10.5%       1.3%       46       -0.027       0.012       622       1,644,561		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
45       Jacksonville, FL       11.3%       1.7%       48       -0.034       0.014       373       1,100,491         46       SacramentoYolo, CA       11.8%       1.6%       1       0.041       0.050       427       1,796,857         47       NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC       10.8%       1.7%       45       -0.021       0.017       374       1,569,541         48       Orlando, FL       10.5%       1.3%       46       -0.027       0.012       622       1,644,561		·							
46       SacramentoYolo, CA       11.8%       1.6%       1       0.041       0.050       427       1,796,857         47       NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC       10.8%       1.7%       45       -0.021       0.017       374       1,569,541         48       Orlando, FL       10.5%       1.3%       46       -0.027       0.012       622       1,644,561		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
47       NorfolkVirginia Beach—Newport News, VANC       10.8%       1.7%       45       -0.021       0.017       374       1,569,541         48       Orlando, FL       10.5%       1.3%       46       -0.027       0.012       622       1,644,561									
48 Orlando, FL 10.5% 1.3% 46 -0.027 0.012 622 1,644,561									
		1 ,							
	49								

Table 5
Population Variables
(Standard errors in parentheses)

			Par	ticipation			En	hancement	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Small MSA	0.0095				0.0198			
A.		(0.0285)				(0.0350)			
	Medium MSA	-0.0491				0.0449			
Coefficients		(0.0227)*				(0.0265)+			
from	Large MSA	-0.0262				0.0632			
(Weighted)		(0.0201)				(0.0228)**			
Probit	MSA Population		-3.95e-09	1.36e-08			-8.80e-10	2.10e-08	
Regressions			(3.80e-09)	(1.02e-08)			(3.24e-09)	(1.15e-08)+	
regressions	MSA Population			-1.94e-15				-2.39e-15	
	Squared			(1.13e-15)+				(1.24e-15)+	
	Medium-Low				-0.0170				0.0275
	Density				(0.0194)				(0.0224)
	Medium-High				-0.0282				0.0860
	Density				(0.0200)				(0.0244)**
	High Density				-0.0177				0.0577
					(0.0224)				(0.0224)*
					/				
	Log Likelihood	-33470.6	-33472.1	-33469.3	-33473.5	-28694.7	-28696.9	-28693.1	-28688.2
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2252	0.2252	0.2252	0.2251	0.0593	0.0592	0.0593	0.0595
			Par	ticipation			En	hancement	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>B.</b>	Small MSA	0.0021				0.0035			
		(0.0064)				(0.0062)			
Marginal	Medium MSA	-0.011				0.008			
Effects		(0.0052)*				(0.0048)+			
from	Large MSA	-0.0058				0.0110			
(Weighted)		(0.0045)				(0.0039)**			
Probit	MSA Population		-8.89e-10	3.06e-09			-1.54e-10	3.67e-09	
Regressions			(8.56e-10)				(5.67e-10)		
regressions	MSA			-4.37e-16				-4.18e-16	
	Population			(2.55e-16)+				(2.17e-16)+	
	Squared			(2.336-10)+				(2.176-10)+	
	Medium-Low				-0.00385				0.00485
	Density				(0.00440)				(0.00399)
	Medium-High				-0.00639				0.0154
	Density				(0.00456)				(0.00450)**
	High Density				-0.00400				0.0103
					(0.00508)				(0.00406)*

standard errors are in parentheses.

- (1) non-MSA is the base for these regressions
- (2) & (3) Since no meaningful population data was available for non-MSA areas, we include a "rural area" dummy variable in each of these regressions. The population and density variables were interacted with (1-RURAL). Therefore the coefficients on the population variables do not include non-MSA areas.
- (4) low density is the base for these regressions. One quarter of the observations fit into each density type.
- +significant at 90% confidence level
- \*significant at 95% confidence level
- \*\*significant at 99% confidence level

Table 6
Average and Median Location Effects, by Type of Location

Type	N	Median	Average	Std Dev	Median	Average	Std Dev
		Participation	Participation	Participation	Enhancement	Enhancement	Enhancement
		Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal
		Effect	Effect	Effect	Effect	Effect	Effect
Rural	49	-0.029	-0.0292	0.0486	-0.020	-0.0135	0.0274
Small MSA	130*	-0.0225	-0.0271	0.0772	-0.018	-0.00708	0.0495
Medium MSA	95	-0.046	-0.0535	0.0579	-0.012	-0.0111	0.0313
Large MSA	48	-0.0445	-0.0397	0.0324	-0.008	-0.00652	0.0150

<sup>\*</sup>N=127 for enhancement because 3 small MSAs perfectly predicted non-adoption.

# Table 7a Population Variable Coefficients from (weighted) Probit Regressions, Includes Multi-Establishment/Population Interactions (Standard errors in parenthesis)

(1   Multi-est. dummy	511 -0 39)** (0.0 247 430) 1571 321)+ 4463 179)+ 1267	(2) .1661 .211)**	(3) -0.1661 (0.0210)**	(4) -0.1509 (0.0289)**	(5) -0.0578 (0.0404) 0.0013 (0.0492)	(6) -0.0014 (0.0210)	(7) -0.0038 (0.0212)	(8) -0.0463 (0.0334)
(0.033   Small MSA	39)** (0.0 247 430) 1571 121)+ 4463 179)+				(0.0404) 0.0013 (0.0492)			
Small MSA         0.02           (0.04           Medium MSA         -0.02           (0.03)           Large MSA         -0.02           Small MSA ×         -0.02           Multi-est. dummy         (0.05           Medium MSA ×         0.01           Multi-est. dummy         (0.04           Large MSA ×         0.04           Multi-est. dummy         (0.03           MSA Population         (0.03	247 430) 1571 121)+ 1463 179)+ 1267	211)**	(0.0210)**	(0.0289)**	0.0013 (0.0492)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)	(0.0334)
(0.04   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.05)   (0	430) 1571 1321)+ 1463 1279)+ 1267				(0.0492)			
Medium MSA	571 521)+ 463 279)+ 2267							
Color	321)+ 463 279)+ 2267							
Large MSA	0463 (279)+ (267				0.0317			
(0.02   Small MSA ×   -0.02   Multi-est. dummy   (0.05   Medium MSA ×   Multi-est. dummy   (0.04   Large MSA ×   Multi-est. dummy   (0.03   MSA Population   (0.03   MSA Population   (0.03   MSA Population   (0.04   MSA Population   (0.05   MSA	279)+				(0.0342)			
Small MSA × -0.05 Multi-est. dummy (0.05 Medium MSA × 0.01 Multi-est. dummy (0.04 Large MSA × 0.04 Multi-est. dummy (0.03 MSA Population	267				0.0134			
Multi-est. dummy (0.05  Medium MSA × 0.01  Multi-est. dummy (0.04  Large MSA × 0.04  Multi-est. dummy (0.03  MSA Population					(0.0284)			
Medium MSA × 0.01  Multi-est. dummy (0.04  Large MSA × 0.04  Multi-est. dummy (0.03  MSA Population					0.0532			
Multi-est. dummy (0.04  Large MSA × 0.04  Multi-est. dummy (0.03  MSA Population	570)				(0.0696)			
Large MSA × 0.04 Multi-est. dummy (0.03 MSA Population					0.0436			
Multi-est. dummy (0.03 MSA Population					(0.0538)			
MSA Population					0.1234			
·					(0.0447)**			
MSA Population	-1.2	27e-08*	-3.07e-09			-4.96e-09	2.07e-08	
MSA Population	(5.1	16e-09)	(9.37e-09)			(4.08e-09)	(1.03e-08)*	
			-1.09e-15				-2.92e-15	
Squared			(1.02e-15)				(1.13e-15)**	
MSA Population ×	1.86	6e-08**	1.82e-08**			1.45e-08	1.44e-08	
Multi-est. dummy	(6.3	88e-09)	(6.29e-09)			(5.91e-09)*	(6.01e-09)*	
Medium-Low				-0.0222				-0.0024
Density				(0.0280)				(0.0294)
Medium-High				-0.0212				0.0574
Density				(0.0286)			1	(0.0341)+
High Density				-0.0619				0.0059
				(0.0323)+				(0.0289)
Medium-low				0.0132				0.0760
density × Multi-								
est.				(0.0382)				(0.0450)+
Medium-high				-0.0112				0.0738
density × Multi-								
est.				(0.0386)				(0.0465)
High density ×				0.0961				0.1238
Multi-est.				(0.0417)*		<del>-</del>		(0.0435)**
Log Likelihood -3340			<del>+</del>	(0.0117)				(0.0.00)
Pseudo $R^2$ 0.22	.67.9 -33	3463.5	-33462.5	-33465.8	-28686.8	-28695.9	-28689.2	-28681.9

### Notes:

All regressions include dummy variables for 3-digits NAICS, month that data was collected, and whether it was a multi-establishment firm. Employment and Employment squared were also included as controls. Population was measured at the MSA level.

- (1) non-MSA is the base for these regressions
- (2) & (3) Since no meaningful population data was available for non-MSA areas, we include a "rural area" dummy variable in each of these regressions. The population and density variables were interacted with (1-RURAL). Therefore the coefficients on the population variables do not include non-MSA areas.
- (4) Low density is base for these regressions. One quarter of the observations fit into each density type.
- +significant at 90% confidence level
- \*significant at 95% confidence level
- \*\*significant at 99% confidence level

# Table 7b Population Variable Marginal Effects from (weighted) probit regressions, Includes multi-establishment effects (Standard errors in parenthesis)

		Partic	ipation		Enhancement				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Multi-est. dummy	-0.0343	-0.0377	-0.0377	-0.0342	-0.0101	-0.0002	-0.0007	-0.0081	
	(0.0077)**	(0.0048) **	(0.0048) *	(0.0066)	(0.0070)	(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0058)	
Small MSA	0.0055				0.0002				
	(0.0095)				(0.0086)				
Medium MSA	-0.0131				0.0056				
	(0.0075)+				(0.0061)				
Large MSA	-0.0104				0.0023				
	(0.0062)+				(0.0050)				
Small MSA ×	-0.0061				0.0096				
Multi-est. dummy	(0.0132)				(0.0130)				
Medium MSA ×	0.0043				0.0078				
Multi-est. dummy	(0.0099)				(0.0098)				
Large MSA ×	0.0099				0.0224**				
Multi-est. dummy	(0.0083)				(0.0084)				
MSA Population		-2.85e-09	-6.91e-10			-8.68e-10	3.63e-09		
		(1.17e-09)*	(2.11e-09)			(7.15e-10)	(1.81e-09)*		
MSA Population			-2.44e-16				-5.12e-16		
Squared			(2.30e-16)				(1.98e-16)**		
MSA Population ×		4.19e-09	4.09e-09			2.53e-09	2.52e-09		
Multi-est. dummy		(1.44e-09)**	(1.42e-09) **			(1.03e-09)*	(1.05e-09)*		
Medium-Low				-0.0050				-0.0004	
Density				(0.0064)				(0.0051)	
Medium-High				-0.0048				0.0102	
Density				(0.0065)				(0.0062)+	
High Density				-0.0141				0.0010	
				(0.0075)+				(0.0051)	
Medium-low				0.0030				0.0138	
density × Multi-est.				(0.0085)				(0.0085)	
Medium-high				-0.0025				0.0134	
density × Multi-est.				(0.0088)				(0.0087)	
High density ×				0.0208				0.0229	
Multi-est. dummy				(0.0087)*				(0.0085)**	
·								//	

### Notes:

All regressions include dummy variables for 3-digits NAICS, month that data was collected, and whether it was a multi-establishment firm. Employment and Employment squared were also included as controls. Population was measured at the MSA level.

- (1) non-MSA is the base for these regressions
- (2) & (3) Since no meaningful population data was available for non-MSA areas, we include a "rural area" dummy variable in each of these regressions. The population and density variables were interacted with (1-RURAL). Therefore the coefficients on the population variables do not include non-MSA areas.
- (4) Low density is base for these regressions. One quarter of the observations fit into each density type.
- +significant at 90% confidence level
- \*significant at 95% confidence level
- \*\*significant at 99% confidence level

Table 8
Contribution of Industry and Location to Explaining Adoption Decisions

	Participation	1	Enhancement		
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	Log Likelihood	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	Log Likelihood	
Full model	0.2339	-33093.4	0.0672	-28443.4	
No MSA Dummies	0.2251	-33475.0	0.0591	-28701.4	
No NAICS dummies	0.1526	-36604.2	0.0347	-29434.6	

Note: Cities defined by CMSA.

Table 9 **Interaction of Industry and Location Effects** 

	A. Le	eading Interne	t Adopters (NA	AICS)	B. Top IT-using Industries (SIC)			
	Partici	pation	Enhan	cement	Partici	oation	Enhand	cement
	Coefficient	Marginal	Coefficient	Marginal	Coefficient	Marginal	Coefficient	Marginal
		Effect		Effect		Effect		Effect
Small MSA	-0.0127	-0.0029	0.0085	0.0476	-0.0175	-0.00397	-0.00153	-0.000267
	(0.0302)	(0.0069)	(0.0062)	(0.0338)	(0.029)	(-0.0130)	(0.0405)	(0.00707)
Medium MSA	-0.0640	-0.0147	0.0013	0.0073	-0.0569	-0.0130	0.0279	0.00494
	(0.0241)**	(0.0056)**	(0.0047)	(0.0269)	(0.0237)*	(0.00554)*	(0.0291)	(0.00521)
Large MSA	-0.0372	-0.0083	0.0042	0.0243	-0.0409	-0.00917	0.0371	0.00646
	(0.0214)+	(0.0048)+	(0.0040)	(0.0228)	(0.0210)+	(0.00470)+	(0.0247)	(0.00430)
Top 25 NAICS3	0.8869	0.1512	0.0390	0.2072				
	(0.7270)	(0.0906)	(0.0908)	(0.4489)				
Small MSA*	0.2791	0.0539	-0.0121	-0.0727				
Top 25 NAICS3	(0.0864)**	(0.0140)**	(0.0169)	(0.1062)				
Medium MSA*	0.1618	0.0335	0.0397	0.2020				
Top 25 NAICS3	(0.0692)*	(0.0131)*	(0.0181)*	(0.0831)*				
Large MSA*	0.1205	0.0259	0.0382	0.1998				
Top 25 NAICS3	(0.0582)**	(0.0119)**	(0.0155)*	(0.0744)**				
IT intense SIC					-0.0739	-0.0169	-0.0672	-0.0115
					(0.0702)	(0.0163)	(0.0662)	(0.0112)
Small MSA*					0.1761	0.0361	0.0917	0.0170
IT intense SIC					(0.0927)+	(0.0171)+	(0.0833)	(0.0163)
Medium MSA*					0.0683	0.0149	0.0773	0.0141
IT intense SIC					(0.0707)	(0.0149)	(0.0677)	(0.0129)
Large MSA*					0.0996	0.0217	0.1022	0.0187
IT intense SIC					(0.0620)	(0.0130)	(0.0595)+	(0.0113)+
Log Likelihood	-33464.7	-33464.7	-28674.1	-28674.1	-33465.9	-33465.9	-28691.3	-28691.3
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2253	0.2253	0.0600	0.0600	0.2253	0.2253	0.0594	0.0594

Standard errors are in parentheses. Non-MSA is the base for these regressions

<sup>+</sup>significant at 90% confidence level \*significant at 95% confidence level

<sup>\*\*</sup>significant at 99% confidence level

Figure 1
Comparison by City Size of Marginal Effects for Participation






Figure 2
Comparison by City Size of Marginal Effects for Enhancement









Figure 4
Differences in Industry Marginal Effects for Enhancement



**Table A1: Harte Hanks Sample Versus the Census of Business Establishments** 

	Sample	Census
# establishments with over 100 employees	86,879	168,372
% MSA	82.5%	86.7%
% CMSA	37.2%	42.5%
% >500 employees given have 100 employees	12.7%	10.6%
% Northeast	17.7%	19.6%
% Midwest	27.9%	25.5%
% South	34.8%	34.0%
% West	19.6%	21.0%
% Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (NAICS=11)	0.2%	0.1%
% Mining (NAICS=21)	0.6%	0.5%
% Utilities (NAICS =22)	0.8%	0.8%
% Construction (NAICS =23)	2.9%	4.1%
% manufacturing (NAICS =31, 32, 33)	27.9%	20.8%
% Wholesale Trade (NAICS =42)	6.0%	4.8%
% Retail Trade (NAICS =44, 45)	17.1%	14.7%
% Transportation & Warehousing (NAICS =48, 49)	2.9%	3.1%
% Media, Telecommunications and Data Processing (NAICS =51)	3.7%	3.7%
% Finance and Insurance (NAICS =52)	4.5%	4.6%
% Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (NAICS =53)	0.5%	1.0%
% Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (NAICS =54)	5.2%	5.0%
% Management of Companies and Enterprises (NAICS =55)	0.3%	3.2%
% Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services (NAICS = 56)	2.7%	10.2%
% Educational Services (NAICS =61)	0.01%	1.2%
% Health Care and Social Assistance (NAICS =62)	16.7%	12.8%
% Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (NAICS =71)	1.6%	1.5%
% Accommodation and Food Services (NAICS =72)	5.5%	5.1%
% Other Services (except Public Administration) (NAICS =81)	0.9%	2.2%

Table A.2

Population Variable Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions in Table 5,
Includes Percent Participation and Enhancement Adopters within Firm

	Model	Variable	Old Result	New Result		
A. Weighted probits	Add percentage other establishments adopting participation to column (1)	Small MSA	0.0021	0.0021		
		Medium MSA	-0.0110*	-0.0112*		
		Large MSA	-0.0058	-0.0063		
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.2401**		
		G 11 3 4 G 4	0.0025	0.0020		
	Add percentage other establishments adopting enhancement to column (5)	Small MSA	0.0035	0.0038		
		Medium MSA	0.0080+	0.0081+		
		Large MSA	0.0110**	0.0108**		
		Pct deep	N/A	0.1026**		
without IV	Add percentage other establishments	Medium-Low Density	-0.0039	-0.0039		
		Medium-High Density	-0.0064	-0.0069		
	adopting participation to column (4)	High Density	-0.0040	-0.0052		
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.1637**		
	A 11	Medium-Low Density	0.0049	0.0049		
	Add percentage other establishments	Medium-High Density	0.0154**	0.0152**		
	adopting enhancement to column (8)	High Density	0.0103*	0.0099*		
		Pct deep	N/A	0.1024**		
	Add percentage other establishments adopting participation to column (1) (instrument using average population)	Small MSA	0.0032	0.0025		
		Medium MSA	-0.0032	-0.0075+		
B. Unweighted probits with IV#			-0.0072+	-0.0075+		
		Large MSA Pct shallow	-0.0043 N/A	0.0193		
	population	ret shanow	IN/A	0.0193		
	Add percentage other establishments adopting enhancement to column (5) (instrument using average population)	Small MSA	0.0095*	0.0097*		
		Medium MSA	0.0077*	0.0078*		
		Large MSA	0.0129**	0.0128**		
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.0336		
with IV	Add percentage other establishments adopting participation to column (4) (instrument using average density)	Medium-Low Density	-0.0019	-0.0013		
		Medium-High Density	-0.0012	-0.0010		
		High Density	-0.0027	-0.0028		
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.1538**		
	Add percentage other establishments adopting enhancement to column (8) (instrument using average density)	Medium-Low Density	0.0044	0.0042		
		Medium-High Density	0.0167**	0.0171**		
		High Density	0.0110**	0.0114**		
		Pct shallow	N/A	-0.1604		
		•				

Table compares results of probit regressions with and without variables measuring behavior of other establishments within the same firm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>#</sup> "Old" coefficients are different because probits are unweighted. Instruments are average population or density of locations other establishments in same firm

<sup>+</sup>significant at 90% confidence level

<sup>\*</sup>significant at 95% confidence level

<sup>\*\*</sup>significant at 99% confidence level

Table A.3

Population Variable Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions in Table 8,
Includes Percent Participation and Enhancement Adopters within Firm

	Model  Add percentage other	Variable Small MSA Medium MSA Large MSA	Old Result 0.0055 -0.0131+	New Result 0.0042	
	Add percentage other	Medium MSA			
	Add percentage other			-0.0138+	
	Add percentage other	Large MSA	-0.0104+	-0.0111+	
		Small MSA * Multi-est dummy	-0.0061	-0.0099	
I (	establishments adopting participation to column (1)	Medium MSA * Multi-est	0.0043	0.0054	
] ]		dummy			
		Large MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0099	0.0098	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0343**	-0.1510**	
L		Pct shallow	N/A	0.1636**	
<del> </del> -	G11 MGA 00000 0 0000				
		Small MSA	0.0002	0.0005	
		Medium MSA	0.0056	0.0059	
	Add manageton 41: - ::	Large MSA	0.0023	0.0029	
	Add percentage other establishments adopting enhancement to column (5)	Small MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0096	0.0096	
		Medium MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0078	0.0071	
		Large MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0224**	0.0205*	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0101	-0.0203*	
		Pct deep	N/A	0.1015**	
		1 ct deep	11/71	0.1013	
A. Weighted probits		Medium-Low Density	-0.0050	-0.0057	
without IV	Add percentage other establishments adopting participation to column (4)	Medium-High Density	-0.0048	-0.0058	
		High Density	-0.0141+	-0.0145*	
		Medium-Low Density * Multi-	0.0030	0.0042	
		est dummy			
		Medium-High Density * Multi-	-0.0025	-0.0016	
		est dummy			
		High Density * Multi-est dummy	0.0208*	0.0195*	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0342	-0.1505**	
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.1634**	
	Add percentage other establishments adopting enhancement to column (8)	Medium-Low Density	-0.0004	-0.0001	
		Medium-High Density	0.0102+	0.0107+	
		High Density	0.0010	0.0016	
		Medium-Low Density * Multi-	0.0138	0.0131	
		est dummy			
		Medium-High Density * Multi-	0.0134	0.0117	
		est dummy			
		High Density * Multi-est dummy	0.0229**	0.0207*	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0081	-0.0199**	
		Pct deep	N/A	0.1014**	

56

		Small MSA	0.0050	0.0041	
	Add percentage other	Medium MSA	-0.0076	-0.0041	
		Large MSA	-0.0072	-0.0077+	
	establishments adopting participation to column (1)	Small MSA * Multi-est dummy	-0.0032	-0.0032	
	(instrument using average population)	Medium MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0011	0.0011	
		Large MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0056	0.0049	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0315***	-0.0311+	
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.0150	
		Small MSA	0.0065	0.0064	
		Medium MSA	0.0029	0.0026	
	Add percentage other	Large MSA	0.0017	0.0013	
	establishments adopting	Small MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0090	0.0091	
	enhancement to column (5)	Medium MSA * Multi-est	0.0137+	0.0140+	
	(instrument using average	dummy			
	population)	Large MSA * Multi-est dummy	0.0288**	0.0299**	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0125*	-0.0037	
		Pct shallow	N/A	-0.0904	
B. Unweighted probits					
with IV <sup>#</sup>		Medium-Low Density	-0.0016	-0.0021	
with IV		Medium-High Density	0.0023	0.0013	
	Add percentage other	High Density	-0.0113*	-0.0115*	
	establishments adopting participation to column (4) (instrument using average density)	Medium-Low Density * Multi- est dummy	-0.0004	0.0018	
		Medium-High Density * Multi- est dummy	-0.0065	-0.0042	
		High Density * Multi-est dummy	0.0175**	0.0177**	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0315**	-0.1316**	
		Pct shallow	N/A	0.1384**	
		Medium-Low Density	-0.0017	-0.0024	
	Add percentage other establishments adopting enhancement to column (8) (instrument using average density)	Medium-High Density	0.0052	0.0041	
		High Density	0.0000	-0.0015	
		Medium-Low Density * Multi-			
		est dummy	0.0159*	0.0173**	
		Medium-High Density * Multi-	0.0279**	0.0326**	
		est dummy			
		High Density * Multi-est dummy	0.0279**	0.0336**	
		Multi-est dummy	-0.0113*	0.0156	
		Pct shallow	N/A	-0.2599	

Table compares results of probit regressions with and without variables measuring behavior of other establishments within the same firm.

# "Old" coefficients are different because probits are unweighted. Instruments are average population or

density of locations other establishments in same firm

<sup>+</sup>significant at 90% confidence level \*significant at 95% confidence level \*\*significant at 99% confidence level